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I
INTRODUCTION
Individuals have a variety of interests. A society must decide
which of those interests to give legal force. Beth, for instance, has
interests in maintaining bodily integrity, discriminating against
blacks, and running a cattle farm on her land. The society in which
Beth lives might give some legal force to Beth's interests in main-
taining bodily integrity and in cattle farming, but none to her inter-
est in discriminating. By giving legal force to an interest, society
transforms it from a mere private interest into a legal entitlement.'
The allocation and construction of legal entitlements is, how-
ever, more problematic than that. The various interests to which we
wish to give legal force may come into conflict. Beth's interest in
cattle farming on her land may conflict with Robert's interest in
freedom from noxious odors on his adjoining land, another interest
to which we would like to give legal force.2 Because any interest to
which we would like to give legal force is liable to come into conflict
with other interests to which we would also like to give legal force,
entitlements must be complex objects. Entitlements must be con-
structed so that they do more than simply "give legal force" to cer-
tain interests. They must also specify the extent and type of legal
force that a given interest has in any particular context and in rela-
tion to any other particular entitlement.
I This Article is concerned specifically with legal entitlements, as distinct from
moral entitlements. The Article will discuss legal entitlements under the assumption
that they are held by particular identifiable parties. A subsequent article will consider
the concepts of group-based and public entitlements.
2 Such a conflict was adjudicated in Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Develop-
ment Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972).
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Because the function of entitlements is complex, their structure
is similarly complex. Entitlements are constructed of components.
These components can be arranged in a variety of combinations to
create various forms of entitlement.3
An important starting point for an analysis of the structure of
entitlements is to ask: Why would we want to have variousforms of
entitlement? The brief answer is that no single entitlement form
will function beneficially in every legal context. The form of an enti-
tlement shapes the incentives of the affected parties and also deter-
mines the distribution of advantages and disadvantages (of wealth,
broadly) between parties. No single entitlement form creates opti-
mal incentives and distributions for every kind of social interaction.
Rather, in different contexts, different entitlement forms-because
of their distinct incentive structures and consequent behavioral ef-
fects, and because of their distributive results-promote social
goals.
Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, recognizing that dif-
ferent entitlement forms are beneficial in different contexts, identi-
fied three forms of entitlement: property, liability, and inalienability
rules.4 They then analyzed the efficiency and distributive implica-
tions of each, and gave examples of contexts in which each entitle-
ment form would be valuable. 5 The recognition that the form of an
entitlement can foster or impede goals of efficiency and of distribu-
tive justice immediately gives rise to two questions: First, what are
all the possible entitlement forms?6 And second, what are the effi-
ciency and distributive characteristics of each form?
One approach to identifying the set of possible entitlement
forms is first to identify the fundamental components of entitle-
ments, and then to determine the possible combinations of those
components, thereby identifying the set of possible entitlement
forms. This will be the approach taken in the present Article.
This Article, not surprisingly, does not represent the first at-
tempt to specify the components of entitlements. Writing early this
century, W.N. Hohfeld attempted to identify entitlements' funda-
mental components. Working in a tradition of analytic jurispru-
dence whose inception is associated with the work of Jeremy
3 Familiar forms of entitlement include, for example, property rules and liability
rules. See infra Part II.
4 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Ina-
lienability Rules: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972).
5 Id. at 1093-1105.
6 Is there an infinite number of distinct forms of entitlement, or is there a finite
and identifiable set of forms?
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Bentham,7 Hohfeld offered a typology of 'jural relations." This ty-
pology consists of an identification of the rights, privileges, powers,
and immunities that, alone or in combination, constitute legal enti-
tlements.8 Hohfeld thus attempted to identify entitlements' funda-
mental components. He did not, however, go on to combine those
components to identify the set of possible entitlement forms nor to
analyze the efficiency and distributive implications of different forms
of entitlement.9
In a sense, Hohfeld and, later, Calabresi and Melamed, were
approaching the same problem-analyzing the structure of entitle-
ments-from opposite directions. Hohfeld asked what building
blocks entitlements are made of, but did not then attempt to put
those blocks together to identify the universe of entitlement forms,
nor to analyze each form's efficiency and distributive characteristics.
Calabresi and Melamed analyzed the characteristics of the three par-
ticular entitlement forms they identified (property, liability, and ina-
lienability rules), but did not attempt to determine what other forms
of entitlement there might be nor to ascertain what components en-
titlements are composed of.
The present Article attempts to synthesize and to move beyond
the approaches of Hohfeld and of Calabresi and Melamed. First,
the Article identifies the basic components of entitlements. (It
adopts a different categorization from Hohfeld's for reasons dis-
cussed below.)' 0 Second, the present Article combines those com-
ponents to identify the set of entitlement forms rendered by those
combinations (as Hohfeld did not attempt to do). Lastly, the Article
analyzes the efficiency and distributive characteristics of each enti-
dement form (as Calabresi and Melamed did, but only for the three
entitlement forms they identified).
As discussed below, a full range of entitlement forms is re-
quired for a fully effective legal system because different entitlement
forms are best suited to foster social goals in different contexts." A
7 For a comparison of Bentham's and Hohfeld's theories of rights, see H.L.A.
HART, Legal Rights, in ESSAYS ON BENTHAM 162 (1982). For a history of the conception of
legal rights in the analytic jurisprudence tradition, see Joseph W. Singer, The Legal Rights
Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wisc. L. REV. 975.
8 Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reason-
ing, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913). In addition to these four basic entitlement components,
Hohfeld also identifies what he calls the "correlatives" and the "opposites" of the four
basic components. Id. at 30.
9 Wesley Hohfeld's untimely death in 1918 cut short the development of his very
important work. At the time of his death, Hohfeld was planning the completion of the
theory of analytic jurisprudence he had begun in three articles published between 1913
and 1917. See Walter W. Cook, Hohfeld's Contributions to the Science of Law, 28 YALE LJ.
721, 722 (1919).
10 Infra Part II.A.
11 Infra Part III.
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more complete understanding of the possible forms of entitlement
and of the characteristics of each form will enhance our ability to
structure legal relations in ways that best serve the social goals of
efficiency and of justice to which we aspire.
The costs of failing to see clearly the forms of entitlement avail-
able in a given context can be high. For example, as will be dis-
cussed further in the concluding section of this Article,' 2 a failure to
consider fully the available forms of entitlement has resulted in un-
fortunate consequences in the context of fetal protection policies.
In 1991, the Supreme Court decided International Union, UAW v.
Johnson Controls, Inc. 13 In that case, plaintiffs charged that an em-
ployer's "fetal protection" policy excluding all fertile women from
jobs involving exposure to substances harmful to fetuses violated
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.14 The Johnson Controls
Court held for the plaintiffs, interpreting Title VII to prohibit fe-
male-exclusionary fetal protection policies.' 5
But few commentators have been thoroughly satisfied with the
Johnson Controls decision. Some feminists have observed that the de-
cision, while affording women greater autonomy than a holding for
the defendants would have, still leaves women with the burden of
fetal protection; it is still women who must either self-exclude from
fetal-hazardous jobs, or constrain their reproductive lives in accord-
ance with job conditions, or else risk giving birth to children with
disabilities resulting from workplace exposures. 16
Participants in the fetal protection debate have largely adhered
to one of two positions: that female-exclusionary fetal protection
policies should be permitted or that they should not. The assump-
tion underlying that bipolar split is that equal employment entitle-
ments can be constructed in only one form. As shall be discussed
further in Part IV, consideration of a broader range of entitlement
forms in which equal employment entitlements could be con-
structed reveals a range of previously unconsidered resolutions of
the workplace fetal protection problem. Before moving to that dis-
cussion, however, a framework for analyzing the forms of entitle-
ment must be presented. Presenting that framework will be the
main task of this Article.
12 See infra Part IV.
13 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
14 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988).
15 Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1209-10.
16 See, e.g., Ruth Rosen, What Feminist Victory in the Court?, N.Y. TiMEs, April 1, 1991,
at A17 (beginning a discussion of the Johnson Controls decision with the question: "Am I
the only feminist less than thrilled at the Supreme Court's decision on March 20 to grant
women the right to risk the health of their unborn?").
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Part II of this Article identifies what I will argue are the four
fundamental components of entitlements. Part III identifies the
fourteen entitlement forms rendered by the possible combinations
of those four components, and discusses the efficiency and distribu-
tive implications of each form. Part IV, in conclusion, considers the
merits of the model presented, with particular focus on its potential
value for revealing new options in areas of law not traditionally con-
ceptualized in "entitlement" terms. This Part includes a discussion
of the benefits of this model in the area of equal employment law
and, specifically, in the contexts of fetal protection and affirmative
action.
II
THE COMPONENTS OF ENTITLEMENTS
Writing early this century, Wesley N. Hohfeld lamented that the
"effort to treat as simple that which is really complex has ... fur-
nished a serious obstacle to the clear understanding, the orderly
statement, and the correct solution of legal problems."'17 To help
remedy that lamented state of affairs and to promote clarity and effi-
cacy in legal reasoning, Hohfeld endeavored to find the "common
denominators" of all legal entitlements-to identify "the lowest ge-
neric conceptions to which any and all 'legal quantities' may be re-
duced." 18 His work concerned, as he stated, "the basic conceptions
of the law,-the legal elements that enter into all types ofjural inter-
ests."' 9 Hohfeld presented what may be viewed as a component-
based framework for understanding legal entitlements. The
Hohfeldian framework has long been regarded as an important, if
not definitive, analysis of the elements of entitlements and, indeed,
"has become a staple of academic legal culture."' 20 As Duncan Ken-
nedy and Frank Michelman observed, "no one today doubts that
17 Hohfeld, supra note 8, at 19.
Is Id. at 59.
19 Id. at 20.
20 Duncan Kennedy & Frank Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 HoF-
sTRA L. REV. 711, 751 (1980). Hohfeld's work has been applied, critiqued, or built upon
in a large and diverse range of legal opinions and articles. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83, 119 n.5 (Harlan, J., dissenting); HART, supra note 7; J.M. Balkin, The Hohfeldian
Approach to Law and Semiotics, 44 U. MiAMi L. REv. 1119 (1990); Walter W. Cook, The
Alienability of Choses in Action, 29 HARv. L. REv. 816 (1916); Cook, supra note 9; Arthur L.
Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology, 29 YALE L.J. 163 (1919); Lon L. Fuller, Legal Fic-
tions, 25 ILL. L. REV. 363 (1930); Andrew Halpin, More Comments on Rights and Claims, 10
LAw & PHIL. 271 (1991); Singer, supra note 7; Glanville Williams, The Concept of Legal
Liberty, in ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 121 (R. Summers ed., 1968); Lars Lindahl, Stig
Kanger's Theory of Rights, presented at the Stig Kanger Memorial Symposium on the
Logic of Rights and Choices of the 9th International Congress of Logic, Methodology
and Philosophy of Science in Uppsala, Sweden (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Cornell Law Review).
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[Hohfeld's] list of entities is both an exhaustive and an elementary
vocabulary for modes of entitlement." 21 After delineating the
Hohfeldian framework, the present Article offers an alternative
component-based model of the structure of entitlements that di-
verges somewhat from the Hohfeldian framework and which, I will
argue, is preferable for practical and analytic purposes.
Hohfeld presented the following framework of "jural relations"
that, he maintained, captured the fundamental elements of legal
relations:
Jural right privilege power immunity
Correlatives duty no-right liability disability
Jural fright privilege power immunity
Opposites no-right duty disability liability22
By a "right," Hohfeld means, specifically, a claim against an-
other party that that other party must perform some act (or forbear-
ance) owed to the right-holder. Thus, Hohfeld maintains, a right is
necessarily the correlative of a duty. To have a particular right
means precisely that the relevant other party has a corresponding
particular duty. For instance, that I have a right to the sole use of
my land means that you have a corresponding duty not to trespass
on my land. The opposite of a right, in Hohfeld's scheme, is a no-
right, that is, the absence of a duty on the part of the other party.
This concept of the absence of duty leads to Hohfeld's next set
ofjural correlatives and opposites. To have no jural duty (no duty
to do or to forbear from doing any particular thing) is to have a
privilege. To have a privilege means that one is at liberty to do the
act in question. For example, if I have a privilege to walk on my
land, then I have no legal duty to refrain from walking on my land.
A privilege is, thus, the jural opposite of a duty.
The correlative of my privilege is that you have no-right against
me that I should not do as I wish in the relevant regard. This no-
right correlative of my privilege, Hohfeld notes, does not mean that
you have a duty not to interfere with the exercise of my privilege.
For instance, if I have merely a privilege but no right to walk on my
land, then you have no duty not to interfere with my walking.
Rather, my privilege, being the correlative of your no-right, means
simply that you have no-right to take legal action-you have no legal
claim against me-regarding my privileged action or forbearance.
Were I to have, beyond my mere privilege to walk on my land, also a
legal claim that you should not interfere with my walking, then I
21 Kennedy & Michelman, supra note 20, at 757 (emphasis in original).
22 Hohfeld, supra note 8, at 30.
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would have both a privilege (to walk) and a right (corresponding to
your duty of non-interference).
The next two of Hohfeld's sets ofjural correlatives and oppo-
sites relate to the structures governing transfers of entitlements be-
tween parties. With regard to jural "powers," Hohfeld states:
"[T]he person (or persons) whose volitional control is paramount
may be said to have the (legal) power to effect [a] particular change
of legal relations .. ".. ,,2 When the government condemns my
house in eminent domain, for example, it exercises a Hohfeldian
"power" by forcing a sale (a compensated transfer) of the entitle-
ment to my house. The government thereby forces a change in my
legal relations with the government vis-a-vis that house. Hohfeld
adds that "a power is one's affirmative 'control' over a given legal
relation as against another .... "24 To have a jural power, then,
according to Hohfeld, is to have paramount power to decide
whether to effectuate a given change in one's legal relations with
another party.
The correlative of a power, Hohfeld maintains, is a liability. If
the government has the power, in eminent domain, to alter our legal
relations by purchasing my house without my consent, then I have,
to that extent, a liability. The opposite of a jural power is, in
Hohfeld's terms, a disability; I am disabled from affecting our legal
relations if I have no power to do so. While the government holds
the power to force a sale of my house, I, holding no converse power,
am under a disability to compel a sale of my house to the
government.
Hohfeld's final pair ofjural correlatives is immunities and disa-
bilities. If I am not empowered to change our legal relations-that
is, if I am under a disability-then you are immune from my chang-
ing our legal relations. Since I cannot force a sale of my house to
the government, the government holds an immunity. Thus, the
government's immunity is correlative to my disability. Immunity is,
in that way, the opposite of liability. The government's immunity
means that I cannot change our legal relations, the opposite of what
would obtain if the government were under a liability.
Hohfeld's framework ofjural correlatives and opposites is a val-
uable structure for analyzing entitlements. Nevertheless, because of
the absence of certain crucial distinctions within the model, the
Hohfeldian framework cannot adequately account for all the forms
of entitlement that courts and other legal decisionmakers can and
do use. For that reason, the present Article constructs a framework
23 Id at 44.
24 Id. at 55.
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of entitlement components that diverges somewhat from the
Hohfeldian model.
When one constructs a framework for analyzing the structure of
entitlements, distinctions must be drawn between different elements
of legal relations. The decision of which distinctions to empha-
size-to elevate to the status of "entitlement components"-must
turn on the significance of each distinction to the structure of legal
relations. It would not be inaccurate to analyze legal entitlements
merely by saying that every entitlement is a legal advantage of some
kind. 25 But that "analysis" of legal entitlements would not be very
useful. Further distinctions--distinctions among the kinds of legal
advantages-would have to be drawn and categories created before
an analysis of entitlements would be illuminating or instructive. As
Andrew Halpin has noted:
[I]t is of importance.., to recognise the different kinds of legal
rights. For else the ambiguity of some vague general sense of a
right, albeit capable of spreading comprehensively over every in-
stance of a legal right, will confuse one legal position with an-
other, and will promote dispute at law at the very point where the
law should curtail dispute .... 26
Thus, accuracy is a necessary, but not sufficient, attribute of a valua-
ble framework for analysis of entitlements. A valuable model must
not only be accurate but, also, precise. It must allow us to draw a set
of fundamental distinctions among different forms of entitlement
that highlight the significant differences. 27
The determination that a particular distinction between types of
legal advantages is "fundamental" must rest on an evaluation of the
significance of the distinction for the structure of legal relations.
Therefore, the decision of which distinct types of legal advantages
25 As H.L.A. Hart has observed in a related context, "[s]uch a general formula is
suggested by Hohfeld's statement that the generic sense of a right means 'any legal
advantage'." HART, supra note 7, at 193 (citation omitted).
26 Halpin, supra note 20, at 298-99.
27 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. Hohfeld described his project as iden-
tifying "the lowest generic conceptions to which any and all 'legal quantities' may be
reduced." Hohfeld, supra note 8, at 59. Hohfeld described his four sets of correlatives
as "the lowest common denominators of the law." Id at 58. But, in fact, the four sets of
correlatives are not the lowest "generic conceptions" or "common denominators" of
the law. Lower generic conceptions would be, for instance, the conceptions of "legal
advantage"-within which would fall Hohfeldian rights, privileges, powers and immuni-
ties-and of "legal disadvantage"-which would subsume Hohfeldian duties, no-rights,
liabilities, and disabilities. It is more appropriate, then, to describe Hohfeld's project as
a search, not for the lowest generic conceptions of the law but, rather, for the fundamen-
tal distinctions between types of legal advantages. Thus, the most desirable framework
for analyzing entitlements has not the fewest or most "generic" components but, rather,
has the most significant and useful components highlighting the crucial distinctions
among legal forms.
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to elevate to the status of entitlement components is driven not by
logical necessity, but rather by a qualitative evaluation of the ana-
lytic and practical utility of the various possible distinctions. The
decision in the present Article to diverge from the Hohfeldian
model in the ways discussed below is based upon just such a qualita-
tive evaluation of analytic and practical utility.
A. The In-Kind Enjoyment Component: Diverging from
Hohfeld's Right/Privilege Distinction
The Hohfeldian framework of jural relations distinguishes be-
tween rights and privileges as distinct elements of entitlements. We
can use the example of a parking garage to work through this dis-
tinction. The parking garage in my office building sells both general
and reserved-space monthly parking passes. A general pass allows
its holder to enter the garage, search for a parking space, and park
in it-unless the garage is full, in which case the general pass holder
will have to wait for a space. The reserved-space pass, by contrast,
allows its holder to park in a particular parking space and prohibits
all others from parking in that space.
Suppose that I like to park in parking space X because it is clos-
est to my office. If I have a reserved-space pass to parking space X,
then I have a Hohfeldian right to that space; you have a correspond-
ing duty not to park in that space. If, on the other hand, I have a
general monthly parking pass, then I have a Hohfeldian privilege to
park in space X; I may park in space X if it is empty, but I am not
guaranteed access to it-when I arrive, you may have already parked
in space X, since you have no duty to refrain from (and, indeed, have
the privilege of) parking there.
Thus, when I have a Hohfeldian right, I have a right to enjoy
the object of that entitlement (parking space X) in a way that in-
volves your having a corresponding duty (your duty not to park in
parking space X). By contrast, when I have a Hohfeldian privilege, I
have the privilege to enjoy or attempt to enjoy the object of that
entitlement (parking space X), but without your having any corre-
sponding duty (you have no duty to refrain from parking in that
space).
Hohfeld notes that a duty is the opposite of a privilege. Your
duty not to park in space X is the opposite of a privilege to park in
the space. Hence, the absence of a privilege (to park there) consti-
tutes the presence of a duty (not to park there). And, conversely,
the absence of a duty (not to park there) constitutes the presence of
a privilege (to park there). Therefore, my having a Hohfeldian right
(to park in my reserved space X) means that you have no corre-
sponding privilege (to park in that space), while my having a
1993] 831
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Hohfeldian privilege (to park in that space) would mean that you do
have a corresponding privilege (to park there). The difference be-
tween Hohfeldian rights and privileges thus turns on whether the
other party holds a privilege. If the other party has a privilege, then
I possess only a privilege. If the other party has no privilege but,
rather, a duty, then what I have is a right.
This clarification about Hohfeld's right/privilege distinction
permits a further observation: Hohfeldian rights and privileges are
both grants of legally-sanctioned access to in-kind enjoyment-to
use-of the object of the entitlement (the parking space). The dif-
ference between rights and privileges is a difference in the extent of
legally-sanctioned access to in-kind enjoyment. My right to parking
space X represents legally-sanctioned access to in-kind enjoyment,
or use, of space X, including a guarantee that space X will be avail-
able. When I have a privilege to space X, I am granted legally-sanc-
tioned access to in-kind enjoyment of space X, but with no
guarantee that space X will be available. The substance of both the
right and the privilege is the grant of legally-sanctioned access to
the parking space. The right is a more robust grant of access that
involves a corresponding duty, while the privilege is a more quali-
fied grant because the other party's corresponding privilege may in-
terfere with my full in-kind enjoyment.28 But the domain in question,
the element of legal relations, in both cases is in-kind enjoyment of
the object of the entitlement (that is, access to use of the parking
space). Thus, Hohfeldian rights and privileges both are types of le-
gally sanctioned access to in-kind enjoyment of the object of the
entitlement.
The element of legal relations that both rights and privileges
allocate is the element of in-kind enjoyment; both rights and privi-
leges constitute grants of access to in-kind enjoyment. Thus, the
right/privilege distinction is not a distinction crucial to the structure
of entitlements; both rights and privileges allocate legally sanc-
tioned access to in-kind enjoyment of the object of the entitlement.
The right/privilege distinction relates to the extent of that access to
in-kind enjoyment rather than to some distinct structural element of
entitlements.
For this reason, I will identify one component, "in-kind enjoy-
ment," rather than Hohfeld's two, rights and privileges, to define
28 One benefit that a right but not a privilege may confer is the ability to exclude
others. If I have a duty (corresponding to your right) to keep out of your parking space,
then your right to the space includes the ability to exclude others. A privilege, by con-
trast, could never include the ability to exclude others, since privileges imply no corre-
sponding duties. The ability to exclude others is, thus, one form of in-kind enjoyment
that might be included in a more robust grant of access to in-kind enjoyment but omit-
ted from a more qualified grant.
832 [Vol. 78:822
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this realm. I will define the in-kind enjoyment component as: le-
gally sanctioned access to in-kind enjoyment or use of the object of
the entitlement.
Of course, the in-kind enjoyment component may be divided
into subvariables that would reflect whether the entitlement holder
holds the in-kind enjoyment component in a more robust or more
qualified form.29 The Hohfeldian right/privilege distinction would
be one such category of subvariable within the in-kind enjoyment
component defining the extent of access to in-kind enjoyment. The
right/privilege distinction thus appears to be properly treated as a
way of describing the contents or extent of particular in-kind enjoy-
ment components rather than as reflecting a fundamental difference
between two distinct components of entitlements.a0
B. The Initiation Choice and Veto Power Components:
Diverging from Hohfeldian Powers and Immunities
As discussed above, Hohfeld used the terms "right" and "privi-
lege" to define the realm of in-kind enjoyment of the object of an
entitlement.3' To define the realm of control over transfer of entitle-
ments, Hohfeld employed the terms "power" and "immunity." To
have a Hohfeldian power, you will recall, is to have definitive control
over whether to effectuate any particular change in one's legal rela-
tions with another party. To have immunity means, in Hohfeld's
29 Susan Rose-Ackerman has categorized varieties of qualification on in-kind use of
the object of one's entitlement. She states:
[E]ntitlement holders may face restrictions on the use of their property
that are designed to produce some benefit or prevent some undesirable
activity. We must distinguish between activities that are permitted, re-
quired, or forbidden ....
Case (1) is one extreme: nothing can be done with the entitlement.
In fact, in such a situation it seems odd to speak of entitlements at all.
Case (2) is the opposite extreme: everything is permitted and nothing is
required. Case (3) is somewhat more restrictive: everything is permitted
so long as some required activities are carried out (e.g., a historic build-
ing preservation law). Under (4), some activities are forbidden but noth-
ing is required (e.g., a zoning law). In (5), those who wish to retain title
are required to perform certain activities, which are also the only activi-
ties permitted (e.g., a homestead law). In (6), a proper subset of the per-
mitted activities is also required while other activities are forbidden (e.g.,
a zoning law in a community that also regulates historic buildings).
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. Rv.
931, 934-35 (1985) (footnotes omitted).
30 Again, the decision of which distinctions between types of legal advantages to
emphasize as "entitlement components" is driven not by logical necessity but by a qualita-
tive evaluation of the analytic and practical utility of the various possible distinctions. See
supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text. The decision to treat the right/privilege dis-
tinction as a subvariable is made on the basis of those criteria of analytic and practical
utility.
31 See supra Part II.A, at 410-412.
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terms, that the other party cannot effectuate a change in your legal
relations. In other words, the other party holds no power.
Hohfeld's power/immunity model does not capture all of the critical
information defining the transfer-control realm of an entitlement.
After showing why this is so, I will offer an alternative model.
That a party holds a Hohfeldian power does not reveal much
about what that party has power to do. We know that he or she can
"effect the particular change of legal relations that is involved in the
problem," 32 but we do not know what sorts of changes in legal rela-
tions she has the ability to effect in any instance. The power in-
volved might be merely the power of abandoning her property-say,
her football-and thereby changing her legal relations with you vis-
a-vis that football. Or, the power at issue might be her power to
make an offer of sale of her football to you, thereby empowering
you to force a compensated transfer-a sale of her football-during
the period of her offer. Or the power involved might even be your
power to force the compensated transfer-the sale of the football-
in question. Thus, to say that a party holds a Hohfeldian power in-
forms us only that the party has some ability of some kind to affect the
parties' legal relations. It tells us nothing more.
Significant differences exist between the various sorts of "pow-
ers." The power to force a transfer of the in-kind enjoyment com-
ponent of an entitlement (say, in-kind enjoyment of my football), for
example, is significantly different from the power to confer power to
force such a transfer (by, for instance, your offering to buy my foot-
ball, thereby conferring upon me the power to force a sale during
the period of your offer). One way to understand the difference be-
tween kinds of Hohfeldian powers is to distinguish between first-
order and second-order transfer-control powers. First-order pow-
ers are powers to control the disposition (including transfer) of the
in-kind enjoyment component,33 that is, to control who can do what
with the object of the entitlement (who can use my football). Sec-
ond-order transfer-control powers are powers to control the pos-
ture of the first-order transfer-control powers (for example, to make
offers to buy or to sell in-kind use of my football). A fully useful
model for analyzing the structure of entitlements should readily dis-
tinguish between such first- and second-order powers.
Like the Hohfeldian concept of powers, the Hohfeldian immu-
nities conception is so broad as to be of only limited analytic value.
Knowing that a particular party holds a Hohfeldian immunity
32 Hohfeld, supra note 8, at 44.
33 As shall be discussed below, first order powers would also include powers to
control the disposition of the "monetary compensation component," which shall be de-
fined shortly. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
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reveals little about the relations between the parties. We know,
when we are told that one party holds an immunity, that there is
some sort of power that the other party does not hold. But we do
not know what the immunity (and correlative lack of power) refers
to-nor even whether it is a first or second order immunity.
For these reasons, the Hohfeldian "powers and immunities"
framework for the transfer control realm is not specific enough to
distinguish between the various transfer control arrangements pos-
sible in entitlement forms. To know that Party A has a power (or,
conversely, that Party B has no immunity) is to know practically
nothing about the parties' legal relations. What would be informa-
tive would be to know which parties hold what I will call the "initia-
tion choice" and "veto power" components.
I will define the initiation choice component as power to initiate
or refrain from initiating transfer of the in-kind enjoyment compo-
nent (say, in-kind enjoyment of my football) from its initial holder to
the other party. To initiate a transfer is to make an offer of, or a
request for, transfer. The most common form of transfer initiation
is the offer to sell or to purchase. I will define the veto power com-
ponent as the power to refuse a transfer of the in-kind component
that has been initiated. For instance, when you offer to rent or buy
my football, and I hold veto power, I may decide whether or not to
transfer in-kind use in return for compensation as you have offered.
Once we know which parties hold initiation choice and which
hold veto power, we immediately grasp a complete understanding
of the parties' transfer control relations. We immediately know who
holds what degree of control over whether a particular change in
legal relations will occur.
Let us take a familiar form of entitlement, customarily called a
"property rule," as an example. Under a property rule, a party who
so desires may offer to buy the object of the entitlement from the
entitlement holder. The entitlement holder in turn may accept that
offer and sell the object of the entitlement or may decline the offer
for any reason.3 4 A property rule is the type of entitlement form
that would apply if, for example, you wished to purchase my foot-
ball. The sale would occur only if I consented to sell the football to
you at the price offered.
To describe the transfer control realm of a property rule in
Hohfeldian terms, one would say that both parties hold certain pow-
ers and both parties hold certain immunities. Since that description
would be unilluminating, we would go on to add that, with regard to
the powers held, each party holds initiation choice-that is, each can
-4 See Galabresi & Melamed, supra note 4, at 1092.
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make an offer for a compensated transfer, thereby conferring on the
other the power to force a compensated transfer. And we would
add that, with regard to immunities, each party holds a veto
power-the power to refuse the transfer. In other words, to make
the powers and immunities description useful, the additional infor-
mation required would be, precisely, the allocation of initiation
choice and veto power. That additional information would deline-
ate who holds what forms of first-order transfer control (control
over whether there will be a transfer of the in-kind component) and
also would communicate who holds what forms of second-order
transfer control (control over the extent of first order control held
by the other party). Staying with the property rule example, know-
ing that you and I each hold veto power and initiation choice, we
know that, since either of us can veto transfer, no forced transfer of
the in-kind component may occur on the first-order level. We also
know that each of us holds the second-order power to confer upon
the other the power to force a transfer; you or I would confer that
power to the other by making an offer of purchase or sale, that is, by
initiating transfer.
The problem with the Hohfeldian powers and immunities de-
scription of the transfer control realm is not that it is inaccurate
(quite the reverse, it is perfectly accurate). Rather, the problem with
the Hohfeldian description is that it is unhelpful. That each party
holds certain powers and immunities is true under virtually all enti-
tlement forms. But knowing that each party holds certain powers
and immunities is scarcely informative about the structure of the
parties' transfer control relations. The Hohfeldian powers and im-
munities framework does not entail sufficient specificity to convey
the minimally necessary information to distinguish one transfer con-
trol arrangement from another. The initiation choice/veto power
structure conveys that minimally necessary information.
Transfer control arrangements govern changes of legal rela-
tions. Initiation choice and veto power, respectively, are the start
and stop controls on such changes. The initiation choice/veto
power structure conveys the minimal information needed to distin-
guish between different transfer control arrangements precisely be-
cause initiation choice and veto power-the start and stop controls
on change-are the essential dimensions of transfer control.3 5
35 The two aspects of transfer control, initiation choice and veto power, interact to
shape the transfer control arrangement of an entitlement form. Veto power, for in-
stance, is relevant only if the other party has initiation power. If one party cannot initi-
ate a transfer, then the other will have no use for veto power. And the implications of
one party's initiation choice are entirely dependant upon whether the other party holds
veto power: Where I hold the only veto power, my initiating a transfer means that I will
actually effectuate a transfer-since you hold no veto power. Similarly, where neither
[Vol. 78:822836
STRUCTURE OF ENTITLEMENTS
In sum, only when the posture of the two aspects of transfer
control-initiation choice and veto power-is known, are the trans-
fer control arrangements of any given entitlement form defined.
For that reason, the initiation choice/veto power framework for ana-
lyzing transfer control arrangements permits clear analysis of enti-
tlement forms in a way that the Hohfeldian powers and immunities
framework does not.
C. The Monetary Compensation Component: A Dimension
Not Reflected in the Hohfeldian Framework
In addition to the realms of in-kind enjoyment and transfer con-
trol, which Hohfeld's framework addresses, there is another crucial
aspect of the structure of entitlements that Hohfeld does not ad-
dress at all. This missing element is the realm of monetary
compensation.
Certain fundamentally distinct entitlement forms are distin-
guished from each other only by their different structures governing
monetary compensation for transfer of in-kind enjoyment. For ex-
ample, under the property rule entitlement form, discussed above, I
may grant or veto your request for in-kind use of my football, and I
am further entitled to receive monetary compensation from you in
exchange for transferring in-kind use of the ball to you. I may, for
example, rent or sell my football to you. By contrast, if you desired
in-kind enjoyment of not my football but, rather, my sexual favors,
then, while I could freely grant or veto your request as I wished,
what I would not be permitted to do would be to accept monetary
compensation in exchange for in-kind enjoyment. The same analy-
sis would apply if you desired in-kind use of my kidney, that is, if you
were requesting that I act as a donor for a kidney transplant. I could
grant or decline your request for transfer of in-kind use of my kid-
ney, but I could not (in most states) accept monetary compensation
in return for the transfer. Rather than a property rule entitlement
form as would govern sale to you of my football, a market inaliena-
bility entitlement form, (discussed further below), which allows gifts
you nor I hold veto power, my initiating a transfer means that I will actually effectuate
the transfer (since you hold no veto). By contrast, where you and I both hold veto
power, my initiating a transfer means that I have conferred upon you the power to force
a transfer (i.e., I have made an offer, I have initiated a transfer subject to your veto).
Finally, where you hold the only veto power, my initiating a transfer-in effect, making
an offer to transfer-makes little difference since you at all times have available to you
the option of forcing a transfer, since I have no veto power. Thus, the implications of
one party's holding initiation choice depend on which of the parties hold veto power.
Overall, then, the shape of the transfer control arrangements of a given entitlement
form is a function of the combined postures of the initiation choice and veto power
components.
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but not sales, would govern grants of sexual access or of bodily
organs.
The difference between the property rule and the market ina-
lienability rule entitlement forms is in their treatment of monetary
compensation. Under both entitlement forms you may request (ini-
tiate transfer of) in-kind enjoyment, and I may grant or veto transfer
to you of that in-kind component. The difference between the two
entitlement forms is that, under the property rule, I may receive
monetary compensation for transfer of in-kind enjoyment while,
under the market inalienability form, I may not. In addition to the
property and market inalienability entitlement forms, other distinct
entitlement forms, discussed below, also are distinguished only by
their different monetary compensation structures.
Because the forms of legal relations between parties are largely
defined by the structures governing monetary compensation, a
framework for analyzing entitlement forms must include a monetary
compensation component if it is to render a meaningful analysis or
description of the various possible forms of entitlement. I will de-
fine the monetary compensation component as: a right to monetary
compensation for transfer of the in-kind enjoyment component.
The Hohfeldian framework does not identify a monetary compensa-
tion component.36 Because it does not, the Hohfeldian framework
cannot distinguish between entitlement forms that differ only on the
compensation dimension.
D. The Four Component Model
The present Article presents a four-component model of the
structure of entitlements that, I suggest, is of greater practical and
analytic utility than the Hohfeldian framework from which it di-
verges. To summarize, the present Article defines the in-kind enjoy-
ment component as legally sanctioned access to in-kind enjoyment
or use of the object of the entitlement. For instance, as part of the
entitlement to my house, I am entitled to occupy it. The initiation
choice component is defined as the power to initiate or refrain from
initiating transfer of the in-kind enjoyment component from its orig-
inal holder to the conflicting party. To initiate a transfer is to make
an offer of, or a request for, transfer. A common form of transfer
36 1 should say that Hohfeld's model does not specifically account for the monetary
compensation component. Of course, being entitled to monetary compensation consti-
tutes a Hohfeldian right, and owing monetary compensation constitutes a Hohfeldian
duty. Again, then, the problem is not that the Hohfeldian model is inaccurate but,
rather, that it is not specific enough to analyze entitlement forms adequately. The reason
for the Hohfeldian framework's inability to distinguish between entitlement forms that
differ only on the monetary compensation dimension is Hohfeld's failure to distinguish
between two distinct kinds of rights: in-kind rights and monetary compensation rights.
[Vol. 78:822838
STRUCTURE OF ENTITLEMENTS
initiation is the offer to sell or to purchase. The veto power compo-
nent is defined as the power to refuse a transfer of the in-kind com-
ponent that has been initiated. For example, when you offer to rent
or buy my house, I may transfer in-kind use to you as you have re-
quested or I may refuse the transfer. The monetary compensation
component is defined as the right to monetary compensation for
transfer of the in-kind enjoyment component. I am entitled, for in-
stance, to require payment from you if I rent or sell you my house.
By defining the four entitlement components of in-kind enjoyment,
initiation choice, veto power, and monetary compensation, the four-
component model of this article allows for an analytically sound and
pragmatically useful analysis of the forms of entitlement.37
Before moving on to examine the forms of entitlement to which
the four-component model gives rise, one preliminary note is in or-
der. Within the four entitlement components inhere subvariables
that determine whether a party holds the entitlement component in
question in a full or qualified form. As mentioned earlier, for in-
stance, in-kind enjoyment may be qualified.3 8 My in-kind enjoyment
of parking space X may be limited by your privilege of parking in
space X if you happen to get there first. Or my in-kind enjoyment of
my stereo may be qualified by a requirement that I not play it so
loudly as to disturb my neighbors. Similarly, while the fullest form
of initiation choice would include both the power to initiate and the
power to refrain from initiating a transfer of the in-kind component,
initiation choice could be limited on one of those dimensions. For
instance, where transfer of the in-kind component is prohibited, one
may not initiate a transfer. An example of a non-transferable in-
kind component is one's right to vote in a federal election. 39 Con-
versely, where transfer is required, one must, in some circumstances,
initiate a transfer. Examples of such circumstances will be discussed
below.40
37 The four entitlement components presented-in-kind enjoyment, initiation
choice, veto power, and monetary compensation-encompass the primary interests as-
sociated with legal entitlements. The posture of the in-kind enjoyment component de-
fines what use the entitlement holder may make of the object of the entitlement. Where
possible transfer of the in-kind enjoyment component is contemplated, the posture of
the initiation choice, veto power, and monetary compensation components becomes rel-
evant. I do not argue, however, that this four-component approach to analyzing entitle-
ments is the only approach possible or the sole one demanded by logical necessity.
Rather, the four-component model represents one perspective, only "one view of the
Cathedral." Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 4, at 1089 n.2 ("As Professor Harry Wel-
lington is fond of saying about many discussions of law, this article is meant to be only
one of Monet's paintings of the Cathedral at Rouen. To understand the Cathedral one
must see all of them." (citation omitted)).
38 See supra text accompanying note 29.
39 See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
40 See infra text accompanying notes 99-102.
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Regarding qualification of the veto power component, the ful-
lest form of veto power would allow its holder to veto or to refrain
from vetoing transfer at his or her discretion. But where transfer is
prohibited, one may be required to veto any transfers that are initi-
ated. For instance, if someone offers to sell me his or her vote, I
must veto the transaction.
Like the other entitlement components, the monetary compen-
sation component may be extinguished entirely or held in a full or
qualified form. Where the monetary compensation component is
extinguished, the in-kind holder may not accept compensation for
transferring in-kind use (she may give away but may not sell the in-
kind component, as is generally the case with human organs). 4' Or,
rather than being extinguished entirely, the monetary compensation
component may be qualified such that the in-kind holder must re-
ceive compensation for transferring the in-kind component. Such a
qualification would constitute a no-gift constraint whereby the enti-
tled party may sell in-kind use but may not give it away. Such no-gift
constraints generally protect third-party interests in contexts such as
bankruptcy, where the no-gift rule protects creditors against deple-
tion of the debtor's assets.42 Or the monetary compensation com-
ponent may be qualified such that the in-kind holder may transfer
in-kind use only in exchange for a minimum compensation price set
by a court. Such minimum-price constraints also are frequently
used in the bankruptcy context.43
For most purposes, the four entitlement components-in-kind
use, initiation choice, veto power, and monetary compensation-
suffice to describe the construction of entitlements. However, we
should remain aware that the foregoing subvariables within those
four components may modify the entitlement forms created by the
combinations of the four components. This Article will focus on the
four components, and will address the subvariables as they arise
within the discussion.
III
THE FORMS OF ENTITLEMENT
Having identified the four components of entitlements, we can
now proceed to consider the forms of entitlement created by com-
bining those components. As a starting point, this Article will ana-
lyze, in terms of the four components, the three entitlement forms
identified by Calabresi and Melamed.
41 See infra text accompanying note 142.
42 See infra note 108.
43 See infra note 108.
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Calabresi and Melamed, in their germinal article, present a
schema of three entitlement forms: property rules, liability rules,
and inalienability rules.44 The property rule was discussed briefly
above.45 As Calabresi and Melamed put it, "[a]n entitlement is pro-
tected by a property rule to the extent that someone who wishes to
remove the entitlement from its holder must buy it from him in a
voluntary transaction in which the value of the entitlement is agreed
upon by the seller." 46 A property rule would apply if you wished to
purchase my house. The sale would occur only if I consented to sell
the house at the price you offered.
Calabresi and Melamed's second entitlement form is the liabil-
ity rule. This rule allows a non-entitled party to purchase an entitle-
ment from its holder at a price set by a court even without the
consent of the entitlement holder. As stated by Calabresi and Me-
lamed, "[w]henever someone may destroy the initial entitlement if
he is willing to pay an objectively determined value for it, an entitle-
ment is protected by a liability rule."'47 A liability rule would apply if
the government wished to purchase my house under its eminent do-
main power. The government could purchase my house at a price
set by a court, even without my consent.
In contrast to the property and liability rules, Calabresi and Me-
lamed's third entitlement form, the inalienability rule, does not en-
tail the possibility that the entitlement will be transferred to the
non-entitled party. The inalienability rule prohibits the entitlement-
holder from selling or giving away the entitlement. As expressed by
Calabresi and Melamed, "[a]n entitlement is inalienable to the ex-
tent that its transfer is not permitted between a willing buyer and a
willing seller."'48 An example of an inalienable entitlement is the
right to vote. I may neither sell my vote nor give it away. 49
44 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 4, at 1089. I will use the terms "form of entitle-
ment" and "entitlement rule" interchangeably. Although the term "form of entitle-
ment" more precisely conveys the intended meaning, the use of two terms for the one
concept is necessitated by the fact that, since Calabresi and Melamed referred to the
forms of entitlement that they identified as entitlement "rules," that terminology has
come into common usage.
45 See supra Part II.B, at 414-416.
46 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 4, at 1092.
47 Id
48 Id.
49 See 18 U.S.C. § 597 (1988).
Actually, Calabresi and Melamed do not state whether the inalienability rule they
describe is a rule prohibiting all transfers or only compensated transfers (sales). Their
use of both the examples of selling one's kidney and of selling oneself into slavery, Cala-
bresi & Melamed, supra note 4, at 1112, suggests that they do not distinguish between
what one generally may give away but not sell (one's kidney) and what one may neither
give away nor sell (oneself into slavery). The present article will use the term "Full
Inalienability rule" to refer to a rule prohibiting both sales and gifts. See infra notes 131-
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Before analyzing the combinations of entitlement components
that constitute Calabresi and Melamed's three entitlement forms, a
conceptual clarification is in order. Calabresi and Melamed discuss
the three entitlement rules they present as three ways of protecting
entitlements and of defining their transferability. However, Gala-
bresi and Melamed's three entitlement rules are not, in fact, three
ways of protecting and defining the transferability of one general
kind of entitlement. Rather, Calabresi and Melamed's three entitle-
ment rules actually define three entirely distinct kinds of entitle-
ments-three distinct entitlementforms.
Under Calabresi and Melamed's conception, a legal system first
allocates an entitlement to a party and then selects the kinds of pro-
tection and transferability options-property rule, liability rule, or
inalienability rule-to afford that entitlement.50 Conceiving of a lia-
bility rule as a kind of protection for an entitlement raises the question
whether a rule that allows the non-entitled party to force a transfer
of an entitlement-even a compensated transfer-without the con-
sent of the entitlement holder can be said fully to "protect" that
entitlement. If an entitlement is understood to entail autonomy to
decide the disposition of the entitlement (e.g., part of my property
right in my house is the autonomy to decide whether or not I am
willing to sell the house), then compensation for transfer without
the consent of the entitlement-holder can never be said fully to pro-
tect the entitlement. 51
A similar point may be made about inalienable entitlements. If
a liability rule less than fully protects or honors an entitlement be-
cause it deprives the entitlement holder of the autonomy to decide
not to transfer the entitlement, then an inalienability rule may also
be said to honor an entitlement less than fully because it deprives
the entitlement holder of the autonomy to decide to effectuate a
transfer.52
33 and accompanying text. A rule prohibiting sales but allowing gifts will be referred to
as a "Market Inalienability" rule. See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
50 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 4, at 1090-92.
51 This point is made by Coleman and Kraus, who state: "It is surely odd to claim
that an individual's right is protected when another individual is permitted to force a
transfer at a price set by third parties. Isn't the very idea of a forced transfer contrary to
the autonomy or liberty thought constitutive of rights?" Jules L. Coleman &Jody Kraus,
Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95 YALE LJ. 1335, 1338-39 (1986); see also Laura S.
Underkuffler, On Property: An Essay, 100 YALE L.J. 127, 143-44 (1990) (arguing that the
pervasively held conception of private property rights as defining an absolute realm of
autonomy is flawed in ways that are particularly manifest in the Supreme Court's takings
clause jurisprudence).
52 Although Calabresi and Melamed did not discuss whether liability rules might
less than fully protect entitlements, they did see inalienability rules as in some sense
limiting entitlements. They noted: "Unlike [property and liability] rules, rules of ina-
842 [Vol. 78:822
STRUCTURE OF ENTITLEMENTS
But the view that liability and inalienability rules do not fully
protect entitlements (and the presumable corollary, that only prop-
erty rules can fully honor entitlements) rests on a flaw in Calabresi
and Melamed's analysis. The three rules do not protect and define
the transferability of an already-allocated entitlement; rather, the
rules themselves constitute the particular entitlement. For instance, if
property law allows the government to purchase my house without
my consent,53 then compensation for relinquishing my house to the
government-and not autonomy to decide whether to relinquish my
house-is all that I am entitled to in that context. It is unhelpful and
inaccurate to think of me as having a "general" entitlement to my
house that is less than fully "protected" by a liability rule in the emi-
nent domain context. It is more accurate and more useful to recog-
nize that my entitlement to my house, within the context of eminent
domain, is fully constituted by a liability rule. I have no legal entitle-
ment to my house other than a liability rule in the eminent domain
context; I have an entitlement precisely to compensation for the
monetary value of the house and not to autonomy.54
Nothing inherent in the concept of an entitlement requires that
an entitlement entail autonomy as to the transfer of the object of the
entitlement. One most certainly could construct an entitlement with
a transfer autonomy element (that is, with initiation choice and/or
veto power), but there is nothing logically or analytically problem-
lienability not only 'protect' the entitlement; they may also be viewed as limiting or regu-
lating the grant of the entitlement itself." Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 4, at 1093.
53 See JACQUES B. GELIN & DAVID W. MILLER, THE FEDERAL LAW OF EMINENT Do-
MAIN 1 (1982) ("Eminent domain is the power of the sovereign to take property for
public use without the owner's consent."). See also Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367
(1875) (holding that the federal government may exercise the power of eminent
domain).
54 Thus, I have a liability-rule entitlement to my house in relation to the govern-
ment that entitles me only to compensation for relinquishing the house for public pur-
poses, but does not entitle me to autonomy to decide whether to relinquish the house at
all. I have a property rule entitlement to my house in relation to prospective private
buyers that entitles me to require compensation for relinquishing use of the house and
also entitles me to autonomy to decide whether to relinquish use of the house. Simi-
larly, an inalienability rule entitlement to my house would entitle me only to in-kind use
of the house but not to autonomy to relinquish the house nor, since I may not relin-
quish, to receive compensation for relinquishment. The content of one's entitlement to
a particular good (here, my house) often varies depending on the context in which the
entitlement is asserted. Cf. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 4, at 1093 ("It should be
clear that most entitlements to most goods are mixed. Taney's house may be protected
by a property rule in situations where Marshall wishes to purchase it, by a liability rule
where the government decides to take it by eminent domain, and by a rule of inalienabil-
ity in situations where Taney is drunk or incompetent.").
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atic about constructing an entitlement-such as a liability rule enti-
tlement-without an autonomy element. 55
Thus, rules-such as property, liability, and inalienability
rules-that determine entitlement forms are best thought of as the
rules constituting or defining the structure of particular entitle-
ments rather than as rules providing for the protection of pre-ex-
isting "general" entitlements. 56 Calabresi and Melamed's three
rules thus constitute three forms of entitlement, rather than one
general kind of entitlement protected in three different ways.
Having made that conceptual clarification, we can now proceed
to consider the combinations of the four entitlement components
that constitute Calabresi and Melamed's three entitlement forms.
After examining the combinations of the four entitlement compo-
nents within Calabresi and Melamed's three entitlement forms, this
Article will then go on to explore additional possible component
combinations and the additional forms of entitlement created by
those combinations.
A close look at Calabresi and Melamed's three entitlement
forms reveals how the three forms are distinguished by their differ-
ent combinations of the in-kind enjoyment, initiation choice, veto
power, and monetary compensation components. Under a property
rule, the entitlement holder holds the in-kind enjoyment component
(she has a right to in-kind enjoyment or use of the object of the
entitlement-say, the house) and the monetary compensation com-
ponent (she is entitled to monetary compensation in return for
transfer of the in-kind enjoyment component-say, rental payments
in return for use of the house), while an initiation choice and a veto
power component are held by each party (either party may initiate a
transfer of the in-kind component and such transfer will occur only
upon the agreement of both parties).
55 See Coleman & Kraus, supra note 51, at 1346. But see id. at 1339-40 (on the classi-
cal liberal view of entitlements as autonomy based).
Similarly, one also could construct an entitlement with no monetary compensation
component. The holder of such an entitlement could not receive compensation for
transferring the in-kind component of the entitlement. An example of an entitlement
lacking a monetary compensation component is the entitlement to one's bodily organs.
For instance, most states allow the gift but not the sale of one's kidney. See infra text
accompanying notes 142-49 (discussing this form of entitlement).
56 See Coleman & Kraus, supra note 51, at 1342 (stating that "rules [governing legit-
imate transfer of entitlements including rules permitting forced transfer for compensa-
tion] are best understood as ... specifying the content or meaning of... rights. [P]art of
the content of a right is a claim specifying the conditions of legitimate transfer."). See
also THEODORE M. BENDrr, RIGHTs 58-59 (1982) (distinguishing "property rights,"
which are enforceable by injunction to ensure the right holder's in-kind enjoyment of
the right, from "compensation rights," which are honored as long as the right holder
receiving due compensation for damage to his in-kind enjoyment).
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By contrast, under a liability rule, the nominal "entitlement
holder" holds an entitlement composed of only in-kind, initiation
choice, and monetary compensation components, but no veto
power component. She is entitled to use of the house or to mone-
tary compensation for relinquishing in-kind use, but she is not enti-
tled to choose between those two. The nominally "non-entitled
party" holds an entitlement composed of an initiation choice and a
veto power component (in effect, an option to purchase the in-kind
use component at ajudicially determined price). 57 For example, the
government acting in eminent domain is entitled to effectuate a
compensated transfer of in-kind use of the property-to give the in-
kind holder monetary compensation in return for in-kind use-even
without the in-kind holder's consent.
Property and liability rule entitlement forms both entail the
possibility that the in-kind enjoyment component of the entitlement
will be transferred from the in-kind holder to the conflicting party.
By contrast, inalienability rules do not contemplate transfer of the
in-kind component. Under an inalienability rule, the entitlement is
composed of only an in-kind use component and a veto power com-
ponent; the monetary compensation and initiation choice compo-
nents are extinguished.5 8 Because the inalienable entitlement is
non-transferable, it includes no monetary compensation compo-
nent; the in-kind holder is not entitled to compensation for transfer-
ring the in-kind use component. Similarly, because the inalienable
entitlement is non-transferable, it includes no initiation choice com-
ponent; neither party may initiate transfer of the in-kind use
component. 59
57 Although courts and commentators customarily refer to the party holding the in-
kind enjoyment component as the entitled party, it is misleading to speak of an entitled
and a non-entitled party in the liability rule context. Where entitlement components are
distributed such that each party holds some components, it is more accurate to refer to
the party to whom the in-kind component is allocated as the "in-kind holder" and to the
other party as the "conflicting party."
58 More specifically, under an inalienability rule, the initiation choice component is
extinguished (since no transfers are allowed, none may be initiated), and the veto power
component is either irrelevant (since there can be no legitimate transfer initiations to
respond to with a veto) or else abrogated (if veto is required, rather than just permitted,
as when the other party illegitimately initiates a transfer).
59 If the inalienable entitlement is violated-that is, if it is illegitimately infringed by
a wrongdoer-then compensation may be due to the entitlement holder. This Article,
however, is concerned with what may legitimately occur. Under a full inalienability rule,
no party may legitimately effect a transfer, so there is no compensation value within the
realm of what may legitimately occur.
For discussions of the role of the criminal law in preventing parties from violating
the transfer control constraints of the various entitlement forms, see Coleman & Kraus,
supra note 51, at 1365-68; RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 201-02 (3d
ed. 1986); Alvin K. Klevorick, On the Economic Theory of Crime, in CRIMINAL JUSTUCE: No-
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In addition to the three combinations of entitlement compo-
nents represented in Calabresi and Melamed's schema, the four-
component conception of entitlements suggests additional compo-
nent combinations rendering additional entitlement forms. The fol-
lowing table represents the possible component combinations and
the fourteen resulting entitlement forms.
On this table, the in-kind component holder is always repre-
sented as "Party A." Therefore, the posture of the in-kind compo-
nent remains constant while the posture of the monetary
compensation, initiation choice, and veto power components varies.
Only in rare circumstances is the initiation choice component of
an entitlement abrogated. 60 For that reason, the table and the dis-
cussions that follow assume, unless otherwise specified, that both
parties have initiation choice. The initiation choice component will
be discussed only in those few contexts (specifically, the mandatory
transfer rule and the full inalienability rule) in which initiation
choice is not held by both parties.
MOS XXVII 289 (J. Roland Pennock &John W. Chapman eds., 1985); Calabresi & Me-
lamed, supra note 4, at 1124-27.
60 For a full discussion of this point, see infra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
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THE FoRMs OF ENTITLEMENT
(with Party A holding the in-kind enjoyment
in each instance)
Party A Only
VETO
Party B Only A&B
component
Neither
1 2 3 4
REVERSE LIABILIY LIABILITY PROPERTY I. COMBINED
LIABILITY AND
REVERSE LIABILITY
II. MANDATORY
TRANSFER*
A holds In-kind A holds In-kind A holds In-kind A holds In-kind
A holds Veto B holds Veto A & B hold Veto Neither holds Veto
A holds Monetary A holds Monetary A holds Monetary A holds Monetary
5 6 7 8
INCOHERENT TRANSFERRED INCOHERENT TRANSFERRED
CLAIM CLAIM WITHOUT
REFUSAL
A holds In-kind A holds In-kind A holds In-kind A holds In-kind
A holds Veto B holds Veto A & B hold Veto Neither holds Veto
B holds Monetary B holds Monetary B holds Monetary B holds Monetary
9 10 11 12
INCOHERENT TRANSFERRED INCOHERENT TRANSFERRED
CLAIM WITH CLAIM WITH
DEDUCTIBLE DEDUCTIBLE
WITHOUT REFUSAL
A holds In-kind A holds In-kind A holds In-kind A holds In-kind
A holds Veto B holds Veto A & B hold Veto Neither holds Veto
A & B hold A & B hold A & B hold A & B hold
Monetary Monetary Monetary Monetary
13 14 15 16
MARKET UNCOMPENSATED I. MARKr COMBINED
INALIENABILITY TAKING INALIENABILITY UNCOMPENSATED
WITHOUT REFUSAL WITH REFUSAL TAKING AND MARKET
II. FULL INALIENABILITY
INALIENABILITY* WITHOUT REFUSAL
A holds In-kind A holds In-kind A holds In-kind A holds In-kind
A holds Veto B holds Veto A & B hold Veto Neither holds Veto
Neither holds Neither holds Neither holds Neither holds
Monetary Monetary Monetary Monetary
* As discussed above, in all but the two entitlement forms indicated by asterisks, both parties have initiation
choice. See supra text accompanying note 60. For ease of exposition, the initiation choice component is not
represented in each cell on the table. Rather, as stated above, see id, both parties are understood to hold
initiation choice unless otherwise indicated.
In addition to identifying the fourteen entitlement forms
created by the possible combinations of the four entitlement
components, this section will also discuss the efficiency and
distributive characteristics of each entitlement form and the
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contexts in which each form will be most appropriate and
beneficial. 61 In this Article, efficiency will be defined as "that
allocation of resources which could not be improved in the sense
that a further change would not so improve the condition of those
who gained by it that they could compensate those who lost from it
and still be better off than before."' 62 Distributive preferences, the
61 Efficiency and distributive considerations are widely accepted as capturing the
critical dimensions of analysis for choosing the best entitlement form for any particular
context. See, e.g., A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 7-
10 (1983); Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 4, at 1093-1101; Guido Calabresi, About Law
and Economics: A Letter to Ronald Dworkin, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 553, 558 (1980).
While efficiency and distributive preferences are the two criteria generally focused
upon in the literature, a third criterion is mentioned on occasion. The third criterion is
sometimes termed "other justice reasons," as it was called by Calabresi and Melamed,
who had the following to say about it:
To the extent that one is concerned with contrasting the difference
between efficiency and other reasons for certain entitlements, the bipolar
efficiency-distribution locution is all that is needed. To the extent that
one wishes to delve either into reasons which, though possibly originally
linked to efficiency, have now a life of their own, or into reasons which,
though distributional, cannot be described in terms of broad principles
like equality, then a locution which allows for "other justice reasons"
seems more useful.
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 4, at 1105; see also Calabresi, supra, at 559 ("[Tlhere are
components of the just society that could only be encompassed in the terms efficiency
and distribution if these terms were given a meaning far different from their ordinary
ones.").
The present article will use definitions of efficiency and distribution that are broad
enough (particularly in the case of distribution) to encompass "other justice considera-
tions." The article presents "distributional considerations" as encompassing not only
the broad issues of equality, but also the more idiosyncratic and individualized consider-
ations ofjust desert and of the just distribution of benefits and burdens generally.
62 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 4, at 1094. When Calabresi and Melamed offer
that definition of efficiency, they add that "[t]his is often called Pareto optimality." Id.
In fact, though, rather than defining Pareto optimality, the definition of efficiency
offered is actually the Kaldor-Hicks definition of efficiency, often called "potential
Pareto superiority." See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase
Further, 100 YALE LJ. 1211, 1221 (1991); POSNER, supra note 59, at 13. The difference
between the Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks definitions of economic efficiency turns on
whether actual compensation is required. Under the Pareto definition, for a change
from the status quo to be deemed efficient, the party who would otherwise lose by the
change must be actually compensated. By contrast, under the Kaldor-Hicks definition, a
change is efficient if the winner could compensate the loser and still benefit by the
change; but the compensation need not actually occur. See POSNER, supra note 59, at 12-
13; Jules L. Coleman, The Normative Basis of Economic Analysis: A Critical Review of Richard
Posner's The Economics ofJustice, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1106-07 (1982).
The Kaldor-Hicks measure of efficiency is used by some to measure efficiency
defined as maximization of welfare, and by others to measure efficiency defined as
maximization of wealth. This Article uses Kaldor-Hicks as a welfare-maximization
measure. Debate is ongoing regarding the relative merits of the Pareto and the Kaldor-
Hicks welfare-maximization and wealth-maximization definitions of efficiency. Because
the welfare-maximization Kaldor-Hicks definition serves quite adequately for the
purposes of this Article, I have adopted that definition for present purposes. For
discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the Pareto and Kaldor-Hicks definitions,
see Calabresi, supra; Herbert Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-Being, and Public Choice, 57 U.
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second set of criteria for selecting entitlement forms, will be defined
to include both broad visions regarding justice in the social
distribution of wealth 63 (i.e., more or less equality) and narrower
views regarding the relative worthiness of parties.
Each of the fourteen forms of entitlement has distinct efficiency
and distributive characteristics; each promotes efficiency and
distributes wealth in a particular way. For that reason, an
entitlement form that may be efficiency-enhancing and distributively
desirable in one context may impede efficiency or distribute wealth
in an undesirable way in a different context. Some of the
entitlement forms are optimal for efficiency and distributive
purposes in a wide range of contexts (the Property rule is an
example) while other forms (such as the Market Inalienability
Without Refusal rule) will be optimal only rarely, in certain special
circumstances. By examining the efficiency and distributive
characteristics of each entitlement form, we will get a focused
picture of the implications of using any particular form and a dearer
understanding of which form will be most appropriate in any given
context.64
A. Quid Pro Quo: The Compensated Transfer Entitlement
Forms
This Article will begin examination of the fourteen entitlement
forms by considering the set of forms conforming to the most famil-
iar format, that in which the in-kind holder may receive compensa-
tion for transferring in-kind use. After considering this set of
entitlement forms, this Article will then consider sets of entitlement
forms embodying alternative arrangements.
1. The Property Rule65
The Property rule (represented in cell three) is perhaps the
most familiar entitlement form. Under a Property rule, as discussed
earlier,66 Party A holds the in-kind and monetary compensation
CHI. L. REv. 63 (1990); POSNER, supra note 59, at 12-14; Jules L. Coleman, Economics and
the Law: A Critical Review of the Foundations of the Economic Approach to Law, 94 Ernics 649
(1984); Coleman, Normative Basis, supra.
63 Throughout this Article, "wealth" refers not simply to monetary wealth, but to
resources and benefits in general.
64 The framework of fourteen entitlement forms applies both to publicly structured
entitlements (such as banking regulation and governmental child custody provisions)
and to privately structured entitlements constructed, for example, through the
formation of contracts.
65 Rather than beginning with a discussion of the Reverse Liability rule (cell one),
we will first consider the Property Rule (cell three) and then the Liability rule (cell two)
because they are more familiar entitlement forms.
66 See supra Part II.B, at 414-416.
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components, and either party may veto a transfer. 67 Party A will
transfer the in-kind component only if Party B provides a price
agreeable to Party A. Party B, by the same token, will purchase the
in-kind component only if Party A is willing to sell at a price agreea-
ble to Party B. For example, Party A will sell her house or car or
Scrabble set to Party B only if Party B voluntarily provides a
purchase price agreeable to Party A.
Property rules foster efficiency in a wide range of contexts for
the following reasons. In the absence of transaction costs, 68 effi-
ciency would be achieved through voluntary transactions, regardless
of the initial allocation of entitlements. 69 That is, given costless
transactions, self-interested individuals, each seeking to maximize
his or her own welfare, would readily strike bargains that maximize
total welfare. Having struck such a bargain, the parties would divide
between themselves the surplus value generated by the efficient
transaction, each thereby benefiting or, at the very least, one bene-
fiting and neither losing. In the absence of transaction costs, then,
we would expect to achieve efficiency if all entitlements were con-
structed as Property-rule entitlements.
The initial allocation of the in-kind component as well as the
form of entitlement affects the distribution of wealth.70 Suppose
that I want to enjoy the beauty of the unplanted field between our
houses, and you want to plant corn there. The beauty is worth two
dollars to me and the corn-planting is worth three dollars to you. If
a Property-rule entitlement to prevent planting is assigned to me,
you will purchase from me the right to plant for some amount be-
tween two and three dollars - something more than the two dollars
the beauty is worth to me and less than the total three-dollar value
to you of planting - say, $2.50. If, on the other hand, an entitle-
ment to plant is given to you to begin with, then you will plant with-
out having to pay me. The outcome is efficient in each case: the
67 As stated above, supra text accompanying note 60, it is assumed throughout the
article that, unless otherwise specified, both parties hold initiation choice.
68 "[T]ransaction costs include the costs of identifying the parties with whom one
has to bargain, the costs of getting together with them, the costs of the bargaining pro-
cess itself, and the costs of enforcing any bargain reached." POLiNSKY, supra note 61, at
12. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960).
69 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 4, at 1094; Coase, supra note 68. The obser-
vation that individuals will bargain to efficient outcomes in the absence of transaction
costs regardless of the initial allocation of entitlements is premised on certain
"Coasean" assumptions that I put to one side for now, such as the rationality of actors
and the absence of externalities and of income effects.
70 The publication in 1988 of The Firm, the Market, and the Law, by Ronald Coase, has
rekindled debate regarding the nature and extent of the wealth-distribution effects of
the allocation of legal entitlements. For an overview of the debate, see Stewart Schwab,
Coase Defends Coase: Why Lawyers Listen and Economists Do Not, 87 MiCH. L. REv. 1171,
1178-83 (1989).
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land is put to its higher-value use, corn planting. But in the first
case I get $2.50. In the second case, you keep that $2.50. That's a
distributive difference. Thus, while (given Coasean assumptions) 71
the initial allocation of the in-kind component will not affect the ulti-
mate efficiency of the allocation of resources, the initial allocation of
the in-kind component will affect the ultimate distribution of
wealth.7 2
Not only the initial allocation of the in-kind component but also
the form of entitlement (that is, the distribution of the initiation
choice, veto power, and monetary compensation components) has
distributive implications. Use of a Property rule allocates wealth to
the in-kind holder and away from the conflicting party. The in-kind
holder enjoys the in-kind use of the object of the entitlement or, if
she decides to sell in-kind use, she receives monetary compensation
in return for relinquishing in-kind use.
In sum, Property rules allow for voluntary transactions that
maximize efficiency and distribute wealth equitably, in the absence
of transaction costs or other countervailing factors. Of course,
transaction costs and other countervailing factors abound in the
world, and give rise to the need for a range of alternative entitle-
ment forms, now to be discussed.
2. The Liability Rule
In contrast to the Property rule, in which transfer requires mu-
tual consent, a Liability rule (represented in cell two) permits the
conflicting party to force a compensated transfer. The conflicting
party has that power because, under the Liability rule, the conflict-
ing party holds the only veto power.7 3 (The in-kind holder still
holds the monetary compensation component.)
An additional example of a Liability rule (besides the eminent
domain example discussed above) is a pollution compensation sys-
tem. Here, Party B, a pollution-producing industry, may pollute and
thereby infringe on Party A's in-kind entitlement to freedom from
pollution, provided that Party B pays monetary compensation to
Party A. 74 Under such an arrangement, Party A holds the in-kind
enjoyment component (freedom from pollution) and the monetary
compensation component (claim to monetary compensation for re-
71 See supra note 69 (regarding Coasean assumptions).
72 See Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Exchange, and Auction: Philosophic Aspects of the Eco-
nomic Approach to Law, 68 CAL. L. Rav. 221, 225 (1980). But see supra note 70 (referring to
current debate as to the nature and extent of distributive effects).
73 A party holding the only veto power is in a powerful position because, while she
can veto a transfer if she wishes, she also can force a transfer since the other party lacks
the power to veto it.
74 See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).
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linquishing in-kind use) while Party B, because she holds the only
veto power, may force a compensated transfer of the in-kind (free-
dom from pollution) component.
Another example of a Liability rule is a "call." A call is a stock
option that permits Party B, the conflicting party, during the period
of the option arrangement, to force a compensated transfer in which
she purchases stock from the in-kind holder at a pre-negotiated
price.75 Party A, the in-kind holder of the stock, holds the monetary
compensation component, while Party B holds initiation choice and
the only veto power.
The example of calls illustrates that full transfer control (i.e.,
holding initiation choice and the only veto power) is itself a thing of
value separate from the value of the in-kind component. Holding a
call is advantageous since its holder has the option to either buy the
stock from Party A (if the pre-negotiated "exercise" price is lower
than the market price of the stock at the time of the potential forced
transfer), or refrain from buying at the pre-set price (if the market
price is lower than that exercise price). Not surprisingly, therefore,
a price, called a "premium," is paid for the purchase of a call. In
effect, the premium is the price for purchase of the in-kind holder's
veto power.76
The efficiency implications of the Liability rule are best under-
stood by comparison with the Property rule. As noted earlier, a ma-
jor problem with constructing all entitlements as Property-rule
entitlements is that transaction costs do exist and necessitate the use
of other entitlement forms in some circumstances if efficiency is to
be achieved. If transaction costs are high in a given situation, then
efficiency may not be achieved because voluntary efficient transac-
tions are too costly. 7 7 The transaction costs attending transfer of
75 SeeJAMES D. Cox ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1290-93
(1991); Norman S. Poser, Options Account Fraud: Securities Churning in a New Context, 39
Bus. LAw 571, 586-88 (1984).
76 Consistent with the idea that full transfer control (i.e., initiation choice plus the
only veto power) constitutes a thing of value separate from the in-kind component, it is
worth noting that the Securities and Exchange Commission regulates calls as separate
securities apart from the underlying stock to which they refer. See Cox ET AL., supra note
75, at 1293; Poser, supra note 75, at 588.
77 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 4, at 1106; cf. Calabresi, supra note 62 (dis-
cussing Pareto [as distinct from Kaldor-Hicks] efficiency and arguing that transaction
costs, like the limits of existing technology, define the Pareto frontier and that, there-
fore, society is always at, or will immediately arrive at, a Pareto optimal point given trans-
action costs); Louis De Alessi, Form, Substance, and Welfare Comparisons in the Analysis of
Institutions, 146 J. INsTrrUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 5, 14 (1990) (observing that in-
formation costs, a type of transaction cost, may pose a barrier that precludes what would
otherwise be an efficient transaction but that, given information costs, "there is nothing
inefficient about the [transaction not occurring]. If information were free [i.e., if trans-
actions were costless], it is true that trade would surely take place and both parties
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the in-kind use component may be so great as to preclude an effi-
cient transfer. In such a case, use of a Liability rule may facilitate
efficient transfers because the transaction costs associated with indi-
vidual price negotiations are avoided by the court's setting the com-
pensation price at which the in-kind component may be
"purchased" by the conflicting party.78
Liability rules can also serve distributive, rather than strictly ef-
ficiency, purposes. Going back to the cornfield example, what
would we do if transaction costs precluded the efficient transfer
under a Property rule of in-kind use of the land from the beauty
lover to the corn grower? One solution would be to give a Property-
rule entitlement to the corn grower, thereby ensuring that the land
is put to its highest-value use.79 But, in giving the Property-rule en-
titlement to the corn grower to ensure efficiency, we also distribute
wealth to the corn grower and away from the beauty lover. What if
we had distributive justice considerations that favored distributing
wealth to the beauty lover rather than to the corn grower? We
might in this case give a Liability-rule entitlement to the beauty
lover and thereby facilitate an efficient transfer in which the beauty
lover receives compensation for relinquishing in-kind use of the
land to the corn grower. We would do so not only to promote effi-
ciency (which could just as well be achieved by simply giving a Prop-
erty-rule entitlement to the corn grower) but to promote what we
view as a preferable distribution (i.e., wealth goes to the beauty
lover) while still achieving an efficient resource allocation (i.e., corn
is planted). Thus, in cases involving high transaction costs, Liability
rules can be used to ensure that the distributively-favored party gets
(some or most of) the monetary value of use of the object of the
entitlement while the efficient party80 gets the in-kind use of the ob-
ject of the entitlement.8 1
It is worth noting that Liability rules are not as distributively
advantageous to in-kind holders as are Property rules. Under a Lia-
bility rule, the in-kind holder, having no veto power, cannot refuse
to relinquish the in-kind component even if she values in-kind use
would be better off. They would also be better off in a world in which transportation
costs... were zero.... Alas, both transportation and information typically are costly.").
78 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 4, at 1106-10.
79 I am assuming here that we know the highest value use. I leave aside just for now
the problem that we do not always have that information when assigning entitlements.
80 I use the term "efficient party" to refer, of course, to the party who will put the
object of the entitlement to its higher-value use-not to describe a party who is, in some
more general way, "efficient."
81 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 4, at 1110.
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more than the monetary compensation to be provided.8 2 Thus, Lia-
bility rules, while relatively distributively favorable to in-kind hold-
ers are not as favorable as entitlement forms that give the in-kind
holder more control over transfer.
While the Liability rule serves to minimize transaction costs and
so to foster efficiency as well as distributive goals, the rule does not
circumvent all transaction costs, nor otherwise structure legal rela-
tions optimally in all possible contexts. A variety of additional enti-
tlement forms must still be considered.
3. The Reverse Liability Rule
In contrast to the regular Liability rule in which the conflicting
party may force a compensated transfer, in a Reverse Liability rule
(cell one), the in-kind holder may force a compensated transfer.
Under the Reverse Liability rule, the in-kind holder holds both the
only veto power and the monetary compensation component.
Therefore, the in-kind holder can force a compensated transfer of
the in-kind component to the conflicting party.83
An example of a Reverse Liability rule entitlement is a "put,"
the opposite kind of stock option from a call. In a put arrangement,
Party A, the in-kind holder of the stock, may force a sale of that stock
to Party B at a pre-negotiated price during the option period.84 In
other words, Party A, the in-kind holder (of, in this example, the
stock), holds the monetary compensation component and, crucially,
the only veto power. Thus, Party A can force a compensated trans-
fer of the in-kind component (the stock) to Party B who lacks veto
power. Like calls, puts are purchased by payment of a premium
which constitutes, in effect, the purchase price of the conflicting
party's veto power.
Another example of a Reverse Liability rule is a buy-out scheme
such as the gun buy-out recently offered by the St. Louis police de-
partment.85 Under that program, the department offered to pay
twenty-five to fifty dollars for any gun in working order turned in
during the buy-out period. The sellers of the guns were permitted
to remain anonymous, and the police department bought the guns
82 Under a Liability rule, the amount of compensation allocated to the in-kind
holder will be set collectively. The "objective" price set by the collective (usually, by a
court) may or may not equal the holder's subjective valuation of the in-kind component.
83 The Reverse Liability entitlement form is thus precisely the reverse of the regu-
lar Liability rule because, under the Reverse Liability rule, the in-kind holder (rather
than the conflicting party) can force a compensated transfer.
84 See Cox ET AL., supra note 75, at 1290; Poser, supra note 75, at 586.
85 See Isabel Wilkerson, In St. Louis, Lining Up to Sell Guns to Police, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
23, 1991, at Al. In 1991, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Pontiac, Michigan held simi-
lar gun-buyout programs. Id at A12.
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with "no questions asked."8 6 In this way, the in-kind holders could
force a compensated transfer of the guns to the police
department.8 7
Reverse Liability rules promote efficiency in a variety of ways.
Two of the efficiency-enhancing functions of Reverse Liability rules
operate'by permitting desirable risk allocation. Arrangements such
as puts,88 for instance, permit investors to control their ratios of risk
to potential profits in ways consistent with their own risk prefer-
ences.8 9 By allowing investors to satisfy their own risk preferences,
puts help to maximize welfare. In addition, allowing investors to
control their risk exposure while still making certain investments
may encourage some proportion of efficient investments that would
be deterred by their attendant risks if those risks could not be
spread.90
Another efficiency-enhancing function of Reverse Liability rules
operates by creating incentives for in-kind holders to dispose of par-
ticular goods in ways that do not impose social costs (externali-
ties). 9I Gun buy-out offers by police departments and soft-drink
container deposit redemption laws represent instances where Re-
verse Liability rules are used to create incentives for individuals to
dispose of certain goods in socially desirable ways. Offers of com-
pensation for guns or bottles turned in to the police department or
recycling agencies (respectively) give in-kind holders financial incen-
tives to dispose of those items in the socially desired manner, rather
than letting guns "fall into the wrong hands" or bottles fall by the
wayside.
From a distributive standpoint, Reverse Liability rules are
highly advantageous to the in-kind holder. The Reverse Liability
rule entitles the in-kind holder to compensation for relinquishing
the in-kind component. And, like the Property rule, the Reverse Li-
86 Id- at A12.
87 Other examples of Reverse Liability rules include stock tender offers, see generally
ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAw 531-33 (1986), and deposit/return schemes such as
the provisions in most states for redemption of deposits on soft drink containers. See,
e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 14,560 (West Supp. 1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1522
(1984).
88 Puts are stock options that allow the in-kind holder of stocks to force a compen-
sated transfer to the conflicting party. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
89 See Cox ET AL., supra note 75, at 1292; Poser, supra note 75, at 588.
90 Puts render their efficiency benefits as risk-allocation devices and facilitators of
investment at the time of the investment, rather than at the time of the forced transfer.
Indeed, there is no reason to believe that the present forced transfer of stock at a prear-
ranged price that, presumably, exceeds the current market price is an efficient transfer in
which the buyer will put the stock to a higher-valued use than the seller.
91 "An externality is ... usually defined as the effect of one person's decision on
someone who is not a party to that decision." RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MAR-
rET, AND THE LAw 24 (1988).
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ability rule allows the in-kind holder to veto compensated transfers
that she views as disadvantageous. But the Reverse Liability rule is
even more distributively advantageous to the in-kind holder than
the Property rule because, in addition to allowing the in-kind holder
to veto transfers that she does not desire, the Reverse Liability rule
also allows her to force compensated transfers that she does desire.
The Reverse Liability rule thus allows the in-kind holder to force
those transfers that will be advantageous to herself and to veto the
rest.
In sum, the Reverse Liability rule allows the in-kind holder to
force or veto a compensated transfer at will. This structure is itself a
thing of value to the in-kind holder (as reflected in the premium
paid for puts). In addition, Reverse Liability rules can be used to
create incentives for socially-desirable transfers which might not
otherwise occur (for instance, where gun holders might not come
forward to turn in guns in the absence of a buy-out offer).
4. The Combined Liability and Reverse Liability Rule and the
Mandatory Transfer Rule
Unlike the other cells discussed thus far, cell four may represent
one of two possible rules. This is so because, in this cell, there are
two possible postures of the initiation choice component, as shall be
discussed momentarily.
a. The Combined Liability and Reverse Liability Rule
The first of the two cell-four rules, the Combined Liability and Re-
verse Liability rule (cell four, rule I), combines the features of the
Liability and the Reverse Liability rules, discussed above. Under the
Combined Liability and Reverse Liability rule, either party can force
a compensated transfer. Under this rule, Party A, the in-kind
holder, holds the monetary component, and neither party holds a
veto power.
Examples of Combined Liability and Reverse Liability rules in-
clude partnership and close corporation buy-sell agreements. In
such agreements, Party A, the in-kind holder, has an ownership in-
terest in a partnership or a close corporation which he may, under
certain conditions, require Party B (the other partner(s) or the close
corporation itself) to buy out. Reciprocally, the partnership or cor-
poration may, under specified conditions, force Party A to relinquish
his ownership interest in return for compensation.92 In such ar-
92 CLARK, supra note 87, at 765 (discussing buy-sell agreements in the context of
close corporations); ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN ON
PARTNERSHIP § 7.02, at 7:22-23, 7:27-29 (1991) (discussing withdrawal and expulsion
agreements in the context of the Uniform Partnership Act).
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rangements, Party A holds the in-kind component and the monetary
compensation component, while neither party holds a veto power.
Thus, either party can force a compensated transfer of the in-kind
(ownership) component. 93
In certain specialized circumstances, the Combined Liability
and Reverse Liability rule will foster efficiency. The rule reduces
the transaction costs inherent in "closed markets." That is, where
only one potential buyer and/or seller exists for a given good, hold-
out behavior by the buyer or seller may hinder efficient transfers.
Moreover, the anticipation that the other party in a closed market
might in the future refuse to buy (or sell, as the case may be) at a
reasonable price will prevent individuals from making investments
and entering into worthwhile business enterprises. The Combined
Liability and Reverse Liability rule provides a substitute for regular
market mechanisms that helps to avoid such market failures.
93 Buy-sell agreements are often described and, indeed, are often worded as if,
rather than creating Combined Liability and Reverse Liability rules, they create
Mandatory Transfer rules (where both parties are forced to effectuate a transfer even if
neither party wishes to). See infra text accompanying notes 99-102 (discussing Mandatory
Transfer rules). For example, Robert Clark states that "[b]uy-sell agreements obligate
the owner of shares to sell them, and the corporation or other shareholders to buy them,
on the happening of certain events .... " CLARK, supra note 87, at 765. Similarly, the
buy-sell agreement at issue in Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429 (7th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 901 (1988), stated that "[u]pon the termination of any em-
ployment with the Corporation ... the individual whose employment is terminated or
his estate shall sell to the Corporation, and the Corporation shall buy, all shares of the
Corporation then owned by such individual or his estate." Id. at 432. These wordings
would seem to imply that the compensated transfer of shares is mandated regardless of
the parties' wishes. But that characterization of buy-sell agreements is surely inaccurate.
If both parties were to agree not to transfer, then the transfer would not occur. The
parties would be under no obligation to effectuate a transfer if neither party cared to do
so. For that reason, it is more accurate to conceive of buy-sell agreements as arrange-
ments that give both the would-be buyer and the would-be seller the option of forcing a
compensated transfer but do not mandate the exercise of that option. It is as though the
would-be buyer has a call (a straight Liability rule arrangement, see supra note 75 and
accompanying text) and the would-be seller has a put (a straight Reverse Liability rule
arrangement, see supra note 84 and accompanying text). In other words, buy-sell agree-
ments are precisely Combined Liability and Reverse Liability rules-and are not
Mandatory Transfer rules (where both parties are necessarily forced to effectuate a
transfer) at all.
It is true that the Internal Revenue Code attaches certain tax benefits where restric-
tions (such as buy-sell agreements) on stock issued as employment compensation are
restrictions that "by [their] terms will never lapse." 26 U.S.C. § 83(d)(1) (1988). But
section 83 of the tax code does not transform buy-sell agreements from Combined Lia-
bility and Reverse Liability rules into Mandatory Transfer rules. Rather, section 83 rec-
ognizes that such restrictions on the transferability of stock can be canceled by the
parties. The Internal Revenue Code therefore provides that, if a restriction on stock
transferability is canceled, then the in-kind holder of the stock must report as income the
net increase in value of the stock holdings that results from the restriction cancellation.
Id. § 83(d)(2). In other words, the buy-sell agreement is not a mandatory transfer
structure.
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For example, partnership and close corporation buy-sell agree-
ments allow business associations to survive as going concerns while
also allowing for unimpeded exit by individual partners or share-
holders and for the expulsion of individuals not wanted by the other
members of the firm. Specifically, under the Reverse Liability prong
of the Combined rule, partners and shareholders who wish to exit
are assured a market for their in-kind holdings because they may
force a compensated transfer. This assurance of liquidity is, in itself,
a benefit to the partner or shareholder.9 4 In addition, the Reverse
Liability prong of the Combined rule fosters efficiency by facilitating
the formation of and investment in business associations by persons
who might be unwilling to participate without assurance of unim-
peded exit through a ready market for their holdings. Under the
Liability prong of the Combined rule, which allows forced buy-outs
of the holdings of individual partners or shareholders, the business
association retains control of the membership in the ongoing enter-
prise. This control over membership may foster harmonious rela-
tions within the partnership or closely held corporation.95 Thus,
use of the Combined Liability and Reverse Liability rule in this con-
text helps to avoid certain kinds of market failures by providing a
substitute for regular market mechanisms.
For the in-kind holder, the Combined Liability and Reverse Lia-
bility rule is more distributively favorable than the Liability rule, and
less distributively favorable than the Reverse Liability rule. As with
the Property, Liability, and Reverse Liability rules, the Combined
Liability and Reverse Liability rule entitles the in-kind holder to
compensation for relinquishing the in-kind component. Since
either party may force a compensated transfer under the Combined
rule, transfers will occur when advantageous to either party.
b. The Mandatory Transfer Rule
As mentioned above, cell four may represent one of two possi-
ble rules depending upon the posture of the initiation choice com-
ponent. To initiate a transfer is to make an offer of or request for
transfer, subject to possible veto if the other party holds a veto
power.96 In the entitlement forms discussed thus far, we have as-
sumed that both parties hold initiation choice-that there would be
94 See CLARK, supra note 87, at 765. Such assured liquidity will often be of particular
importance to the partner's or shareholder's estate. Id
95 JAMES D. Cox, SUM & SUBSTANCE OF CORPORATIONS § 13.4130 (5th ed. 1988).
96 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. To initiate a transfer is, thus, to set into
motion a transfer that may be stopped only by a veto by the other party (if that other
party holds veto power). This "setting into motion" or "initiation" of transfer necessar-
ily involves the waiver of any veto power held by the initiator.
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nothing to stop either party from initiating a transfer (subject to
possible veto) or from refraining from initiating a transfer.
The initiation choice that has been assumed thus far is bilateral
in that it includes both an active "initiation power," (the power to
initiate a transfer) and a passive "repose power" (the power to re-
frain from initiating a transfer).9 7 The bilateral initiation-choice as-
sumption holds in all but two of the fourteen possible entitlement
forms. The two exceptions are as follows. First, neither party has
initiation power if the parties are prohibited from effectuating a
transfer (as in the case of fully inalienable entitlements such as the
right to vote, discussed below). Second, besides abrogating initia-
tion choice by prohibiting transfer, we might abrogate initiation
choice by requiring transfer (as in the case of Mandatory Transfer
entitlements, to be discussed presently). If the parties are required
to effectuate a transfer, then neither party has repose power. In
either case-where initiation power or repose power is absent-
neither party has initiation choice.9 8
97 Cf Hart, supra note 7, at 166-67 (discussing bilateral and unilateral liberty rights
in the work of Bentham and Hohfeld).
98 Both parties hold bilateral initiation choice in all but two of the fourteen possible
entitlement forms. The abrogation of repose power or initiation power in the context of
any of the other twelve forms would create absurd results. If we remove repose power
from both parties (thereby requiring each to initiate transfer), we thus require that trans-
fer occur, unless one or both parties also holds a veto (as will be discussed momenta-
rily). If that required transfer is to be a compensated transfer, then we have described
the Mandatory Transfer rule: a compensated transfer is required. If the required trans-
fer is to be uncompensated, then the resulting entitlement form would be nonsensical.
Rather than defining an entitlement form in which the nominal in-kind holder is re-
quired presently to transfer the in-kind component to the conflicting party free of
charge, it would be more sensible to relabel the parties and identify the heretofore nom-
inally conflicting party as the actual in-kind holder.
We can now consider the implications of removing repose power from both parties
if either party holds veto power. Removal of repose power from both parties turns out
to be nonsensical if either party holds a veto. Requiring me to initiate a transfer if I hold
a veto power by which I can veto the transfer as soon as I initiate it is absurd. Similarly,
nothing is to be gained by requiring me to initiate a transfer if you are free to veto it.
Removal of repose power from only one party (that is, requiring one party to initiate
transfer) also makes little sense. If the initiating party has veto power, then that party
can veto transfer as soon as he or she initiates it. If the non-initiating party has veto
power, then it is hard to see what is gained by requiring initiation.
Let us now consider removals of initiation, rather than repose, powers. If we re-
move initiation power from both parties, we thereby prohibit transfer. Where all trans-
fer is prohibited, the entitlement form is Full Inalienability. Any other entitlement form
is transformed into a de facto Full Inalienability rule if initiation power is removed from
both parties.
There is one exception to the rule that bilateral initiation choice must be held by
both parties under all but two possible entitlement forms. We could remove initiation
power from only one party in any of the entitlement forms in which we ordinarily as-
sume initiation choice by both parties. It might be advantageous to remove one party's
initiation power in circumstances where overreaching is feared. That is, if a less power-
ful party might be inhibited from vetoing a transfer initiated by the more powerful party,
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The latter case, where transfer is actually mandated, constitutes
the Mandatory Transfer rule (cell four, rule II). Under this entitle-
ment form, the parties must effectuate a compensated transfer of the
in-kind component, even if neither party so desires. Under the
Mandatory Transfer rule, the in-kind holder holds the monetary
compensation component, neither party holds veto power, and
neither party holds initiation choice (since neither holds repose
power).
One example of a Mandatory Transfer rule is the mandatory
receivership provisions of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion Improvement Act of 1991.99 The Act provides that the appro-
priate federal banking agency, usually the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), must seize insured depository insti-
tutions that remain critically undercapitalized 100 for a specified pe-
riod of time. 10 1
By taking over as receiver, the federal banking agency, say, the
FDIC, transfers to itself the in-kind component of the entitlement to
then we might prohibit the more powerful party from initiating a transfer. Only the less
powerful party would be permitted to initiate a transfer. Of course, the more powerful
party might effectively pressure the less powerful party to initiate transfer just as she
would have effectively pressured the less powerful party not to exercise his veto. It is,
therefore, difficult to imagine circumstances in which removing one party's initiation
power would successfully redress an overreaching problem. If, however, such circum-
stances were to present themselves, a one-party initiation-ban adjustment to any of the
twelve rules in which we usually assume bilateral initiation choice might be beneficial.
In sum, with the possible rare exception of a one-party initiation-ban modification
of any entitlement form, bilateral initiation choice (initiation power and repose power)
would be held by both parties in all but two (Mandatory Transfer and Full Inalienability)
of the possible entitlement forms.
99 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
100 "Critical undercapitalization" is determined as follows:
"(3) CRITICAL CAPITAL -
"(A) AGENCY TO SPECIFY LEVEL. -
"(i) LEVERAGE LIMIT. - Each appropriate Federal banking
agency shall, by regulation, in consultation with the
Corporation, specify the ratio of tangible equity to total
assets at which an insured depository institution is critically
undercapitalized.
"(B) LEVERAGE LIMIT RANGE. -
The level specified under subparagraph (A)(i) shall require
tangible equity in an amount -
"(i) not less than 2 percent of total assets; and
"(ii) except as provided in clause (i), not more than 65
percent of the required minimum level of capital under the
leverage limit.
12 U.S.C.A. § 18130(c)(3)(A)-(B) (West 1992).
101 Mandatory receivership is provided for where the depository institution has been
undercapitalized on average during the calendar quarter beginning 270 days after the
date on which the institution became critically undercapitalized. 12 U.S.C.A.
§ 18310(h)(3)(C)(i) (West 1992).
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the bank-that is, the bank's assets and liabilities. In return, the
FDIC owes to the former holders of the in-kind component (that is,
to the stockholders) the monetary value of that in-kind component.
In other words, under the mandatory receivership provisions of the
Act, the FDIC and the stockholders must effectuate a compensated
transfer of the in-kind component from the stockholders to the
FDIC. 0 2
A Mandatory Transfer rule will foster efficiency where two sets
of conditions obtain: first, that it is clear in advance that allocation
of in-kind use to a particular party is efficient,103 but distributive
considerations favor compensating the other party; and second, that
(for reasons discussed below) we cannot be sufficiently sure that, if
we allocate the in-kind use component to the distributively-favored
party under a Property or even a Liability rule, the compensated
transfer of the in-kind component to the efficient party will occur.
In such circumstances, a Mandatory Transfer rule can be used to
force the efficient transfer while allocating compensation to the dis-
tributively-desirable party.
For instance, knowing that in-kind use of the land by the corn
grower is efficient, and distributively favoring the beauty lover, we
could consider using a Mandatory Transfer rule to force a compen-
sated transfer of in-kind use from the beauty lover to the corn
grower. But, one might argue, the same efficient transfer would oc-
cur under a Property or Liability rule. After all, what makes the
transfer efficient is precisely that in-kind use is worth more in the
hands of the conflicting party (here, the corn grower) than in the
hands of the in-kind holder, so we would expect the conflicting
party to make the purchase voluntarily. For that reason, Mandatory
102 In most cases to date, the monetary value of the insolvent bank has been nil-so
the stockholders have received no compensation. In theory, however, the bank could
retain residual value even after all of its creditors have been paid. Since the critical
undercapitalization that triggers mandatory receivership is defined as a level of tangible
equity not less than two percent of total assets, 12 U.S.C. § 18310(c)(3)(B)(i), one may
hope that receiverships will commence before all is lost so that the bank may actually
retain some residual value affording some compensation to its stockholders. Indeed,
avoiding a "negative residual" (that is, a negative value of the bank that requires a draw
on the FDIC insurance fund to pay all creditors) is a main purpose of requiring
mandatory receivership at the two percent equity level.
103 Mandatory transfer rules promote efficiency only where the efficient allocation of
resources is clear ex ante. Where we are uncertain about the efficient allocation, enforc-
ing a certain allocation by a Mandatory Transfer rule might well result in inefficiency.
To compare, under a Liability rule, the conflicting party can choose whether to purchase
the in-kind use component at the collectively-set price. Presumably, the conflicting
party will make the purchase if and only if the transfer is efficient. By contrast, the col-
lectively-set price is irrelevant for purposes of allocative efficiency under the Mandatory
Transfer rule, since price does not affect allocation.
1993]
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Transfer rules are rarely necessary (and, indeed, would not be nec-
essary in the corn grower and beauty lover case).
In one sort of circumstance, however, the Property- or Liability-
rule system breaks down. In the usual case, the surplus value gener-
ated by the efficient transfer goes to the conflicting party, the pur-
chaser of the in-kind component (minus whatever part of that
surplus she pays to the in-kind holder, the seller). But we can imag-
ine a circumstance in which the surplus value-the benefit from the
transfer-goes to a third party. In this situation, what makes a trans-
fer efficient is not a benefit to the purchaser or seller but, rather, a
benefit to a third party. For instance, to alter the corn-grower and
beauty-lover example, imagine now that the value of the land to the
beauty lover and to the corn grower is equal. That is, to relinquish
in-kind use of the land to the corn grower, the beauty lover would
charge the full three dollars that is the value of the land to the corn
grower. But a neighbor across the road loves to smell corn growing.
The fragrance is worth fifty cents to him. The transfer of in-kind use
to the corn grower is now revealed to be efficient after all (the total
value of growing corn, including the value to the third party, is
$3.50 while the total value of not growing corn is $3.00). But what
makes the transfer efficient is not a benefit to the corn grower or the
beauty lover but, rather, a benefit to a third party, a positive
externality.
But why use a Mandatory Transfer rule in this situation? Why
should the conflicting party (the corn grower) be forced to spend
her money to secure a benefit for a third party? One possible rea-
son is that the conflicting party owes a duty to the third party. Per-
haps the corn grower has a contractual obligation to the third-party
neighbor to produce corn fragrance.
Still, why do we need a Mandatory Transfer rule? Why not sim-
ply allow the third-party neighbor to sue the conflicting-party corn
grower for an injunction and/or damages if she fails to provide the
benefit (corn fragrance) owed? Presumably, the threat of paying
damages will provide sufficient incentive for the conflicting-party
corn grower to purchase the in-kind use of the land. That is,
purchasing the in-kind component will actually benefit the conflict-
ing party since it allows her to avoid paying damages to the third
party. Again, then, a Property or a Liability rule should suffice.
Mandatory Transfer rules are in fact superfluous in most cases
and (I concede, finally to rid us of the cornfield example) would not
be necessary in the corn grower case. Nonetheless, a Property or
Liability rule would not suffice in two sorts of exceptional cases.
The first is when avoiding even infrequent violations of the duty to
the third party is extraordinarily important. The second is when vi-
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olation of the duty to the third party may be difficult to detect or
prove. 104
The first of those efficiency-based rationales for Mandatory
Transfer rules, that Mandatory Transfer is useful where even infre-
quent violation of a duty to third parties would be unacceptable, is
reflected in the mandatory receivership provisions of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991
(F.D.I.C.I.A.). 10 5 It will be recalled that, under the mandatory re-
ceivership provisions of the Act, the federal banking agency and the
stockholders of the undercapitalized depository institution are re-
quired to effectuate a compensated transfer of the in-kind compo-
nent of the entitlement to the depository institution from the
stockholders to the federal agency as receiver. The third parties to
whom a duty is owed, and whom the mandatory receivership provi-
sions protect are the members of the public.'0 6 The FDIC owes the
public a duty to avoid depletion of the FDIC insurance fund. Bank
failures are expensive. Even infrequent failures may unacceptably
burden the public fisc. Thus, the first efficiency-based rationale for
Mandatory Transfer rules, that such rules will be efficient where
avoiding even infrequent breaches of a duty to a third party is ex-
traordinarily important, applies to the mandatory receivership
provisions.
The second efficiency-based rationale for Mandatory Transfer
rules is, again, that Mandatory Transfer rules will minimize enforce-
ment difficulties and costs in some contexts in which violations of
duties to third parties would be difficult to detect or prove. Mandat-
104 The possibility of a mandatory entitlement is implied by Martin Golding in his
discussion of mandatory exercise of rights. Martin P. Golding, Towards a Theory of Human
Rights, 52 MONIST 521, 546-47 (1968). In the present context, of course, I am discussing
a mandatory transfer, as opposed to a mandatory exercise of an entitlement. See also
JOEL FEINBERG, RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF LIBERTY 233 (1980)
A mandatory right ... confers no discretion whatever on its possessor:
only one way of exercising it is permitted.... If I have a mandatory right
to do X then it follows logically that I have-not a right to do X-but
rather a duty to do X. In the case of mandatory rights, duty and right are
entirely coincident[al].
105 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-242, 105 Stat. 2236; see supra notes 99-100.
106 In the context of depository institution regulation, the public stands as a third
party to the transactions because the public acts through agents (through federal agen-
cies). Because the interests of the public and the agents may not be identical (for in-
stance, regulators may be "captured" by private interests), issues of accountability and
control of the agent arise. Mandatory Transfer rules are one way to manage such agency
costs and to ensure that the duty to the third party (the public) is properly fulfilled.
I do not mean to imply here that Mandatory Transfer rules necessarily involve
agency relationships. Rather, Mandatory Transfer rules may be useful in a variety of
contexts, both public and private, involving duties owed to third parties. For instance, I
will discuss in a subsequent article the use of Mandatory Transfer rules in the context of
private employment contracts.
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ing the contemplated transfer in those contexts will reduce the diffi-
culty or cost of enforcing the duty to the third party.
This second rationale for Mandatory Transfer rules surely also
underlies the F.D.I.C.I.A. mandatory receivership provisions. Be-
cause many factors coalesce to cause failures of depository institu-
tions, it is difficult to ascertain after the fact whether a failure of duty
by the relevant federal agency contributed to the failure of a particu-
lar depository institution. In such cases, where effective determina-
tion of causation is difficult and, therefore, accountability is
reduced, use of a Mandatory Transfer rule may improve perform-
ance. As stated in the United States General Accounting Office's
Report on Bank Supervision, "while we cannot conclusively show
that the regulators would have achieved better outcomes in these
cases [dealing with banks with capitalization problems] by using
more forceful actions, we believe that the supervisory process could
benefit from . . . greater certainty regarding the regulatory re-
sponses .... "107
In sum, Mandatory Transfer rules may foster efficiency under
the following conditions. First, allocation of in-kind use to a partic-
ular party is clearly efficient but distributive considerations favor
compensation to the other party. Second, fulfillment of a duty to a
third party depends upon occurrence of the efficient transfer. And
third, because fulfillment of the duty to the third party is crucial
and/or because failures to fulfill the third-party duty may be hard to
detect or prove, we cannot be sufficiently certain that the efficient
transfer will occur under a Property or Liability rule.
Distributive concerns are central to the use of Mandatory
Transfer rules. Mandatory Transfer rules, like Liability rules, allow
the monetary value of the entitlement to be allocated to the distribu-
tively-favored party while making in-kind use readily available (for a
price) to the efficient party. In fact, the only reason for instituting a
policy of mandatory transfer (rather than simply allocating in-kind
use to the efficient party directly) is to allocate the monetary value to
the distributively-favored party. Since, under the Mandatory Trans-
fer rule, compensated transfer is required regardless of the prefer-
ences of either party, the required compensated transfer might, in
any given case, be advantageous to either, neither, or both parties.
All of the entitlement forms considered thus far permit the in-
kind holder to receive compensation for transferring the in-kind en-
joyment component. By varying the posture of the veto power and
107 Subcomm. on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance, Committee on
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, Report to the Chairman, Bank Su-
pervision[.] Prompt and Forceful Regulatory Actions Needed 42 (Comm. Print 1991)
(GAO/GGD-91-69, April 15, 1991).
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initiation choice components while holding constant the posture of
the monetary compensation component, we have identified five dis-
tinct entitlement forms that have significantly different efficiency
and distributive characteristics. As has been discussed, those differ-
ing characteristics make each of the entitlement forms particularly
valuable for use in particular types of legal contexts.108
108 Before moving on to discuss the rules that preclude or prohibit compensated
transfers, it is worth noting that any of the five compensated transfer rules can be modi-
fied by a "no-gift" constraint prohibiting uncompensated transfers of the in-kind com-
ponent and/or by a minimum-price constraint under which the collectively-set minimum
price is the lowest price at which transfer may legitimately occur. No-gift and minimum-
price constraints are qualifications of the monetary compensation component of an enti-
tlement. Coleman and Kraus have discussed what is, in effect, a no-gift/minimum-price
version of a Liability rule. See Coleman & Kraus, supra note 51, at 1347-52. No-
gift/minimum-price versions of the other compensated transfer rules also could be con-
structed.
No-gift/minimum-price constraints are useful where a third party interest in the in-
kind component would be harmed by the gift or discount-priced sale of the in-kind com-
ponent. Susan Rose-Ackerman, noting the existence of rules permitting sale at market
price but prohibiting discount sale or gift, calls such rules "modified property rules."
Rose-Ackerman, supra note 29, at 935. Rose-Ackerman states:
[M]odified property rules have been imposed on people who are either
insolvent or about to die. In both cases, these rules solve problems that
arise because someone with an interest in the property has no formal
legal claim until some event, i.e., bankruptcy or death, occurs.... The
modified property rule is a second-best way of recognizing the property
interests of creditors, heirs, and tax collectors in situations where the
nominal owner may choose to overlook their claims.
Id. at 949-50. I would add to Rose-Ackerman's observations that implicated third party
interests can be protected by modifying any of the five compensated transfer rules (not
only Property rules) with a no-gift/minimum-price constraint.
No-gift/minimum-price constraints also are useful in certain other circumstances.
By setting a minimum level of compensation for transfer of the in-kind use component,
we preclude the possibility that the entitled party would underestimate the value (to him
or herself or, in certain instances, to relevant third parties) of the in-kind component
and therefore sell at "too low" a price. See Coleman & Kraus, supra note 51, at 1349
n.20. Such underpricing would be undesirable for efficiency purposes because it is only
if the price of transfer accurately reflects the value of the in-kind use component to its
various potential holders that the market will function to allocate the in-kind use compo-
nent to its highest value use. We might also wish to preclude underpricing for distribu-
tional purposes. The set minimum price would prevent underpricing by in-kind holders
and reduce the effects of price competition between in-kind holders who might other-
wise bid down the price of the in-kind use component.
Coleman and Kraus suggest that an additional benefit of prohibiting negotiated
transfer of the in-kind component is that we thereby prevent the conflicting party from
eliminating her potential tort liability. See id. at 1349. That suggestion is inaccurate,
however, because transfer of the monetary compensation component, not the in-kind
component, would eliminate potential tort liability. For example, I eliminate my poten-
tial tort liability not by buying your leg (the in-kind component), but by purchasing your
entitlement to compensation (the monetary compensation component) for any future
damage that I might cause to your leg. See infra notes 109-117 and accompanying text
(discussing sales of the monetary compensation component).
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B. Having It Both Ways: Entitlement Forms Where the
Conflicting Party Holds a Monetary Compensation
Component
Up until this point, this Article has focused on those entitle-
ment forms in which the in-kind holder alone holds the monetary
compensation component-that is, in which the in-kind holder is
entitled to compensation for transferring in-kind enjoyment. But
that intuitively attractive arrangement is not the only possible allo-
cation of the monetary compensation component. We move now to
the entitlement forms (represented in cells five through twelve) in
which the monetary component is held by the conflicting party or by
the two parties together. This allocation of the monetary compen-
sation component, although counterintuitive, can produce highly
desirable efficiency and distributive effects in certain circumstances.
The Transferred Claim and Transferred Claim With Deductible
rules (cells six and ten) and the Transferred Claim Without Refusal
and Transferred Claim With Deductible Without Refusal rules (cells
eight and twelve) will be considered first, followed by the "incoher-
ent" forms (cells five, seven, nine, and eleven).
1. The Transferred Claim Rule
The Transferred Claim rule (cell six) would appear at first to be
a peculiar entitlement form. Party A, the in-kind holder, holds only
the in-kind component. Party B, the conflicting party, holds the
only veto power and also holds the monetary compensation compo-
nent. That at first glance seems rather odd, if not impossible. How
can Party B, who does not hold the in-kind component, be entitled
to compensation for transfer of the in-kind component? The an-
swer is that Party B has bought the monetary compensation compo-
nent from the in-kind holder. To form a Transferred Claim rule,
Party B would buy from Party A her entitlement to compensation for
relinquishment of the in-kind component.
An example of a Transferred Claim rule is a collision damage
waiver. When I buy a collision damage waiver when renting a car, I
purchase from the rental company the monetary compensation
component of the entitlement to its car for the period of the waiver.
I have thus bought any future claim the company might have against
me for compensation for accidental collision damage occurring dur-
ing the period of the waiver.10 9
109 See 1986 Op. Att'y Gen. N.Y. 32 ("[T]he lessor becomes obligated at the time of
[entering into] the CDW [collision damage waiver] agreement to waive any right to re-
cover from the lessee in the event of damage to the rented car.").
More precisely, when I rent a car I procure a Property rule entitlement to the car,
vis-a-vis the rental company (only), for a limited period of time. I lease the in-kind use
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To further clarify the relationship between the two parties
under a Transferred Claim rule, it will be helpful first to consider a
case involving a third party, and then move back to the two-party
case. Sheldon routinely (and legally) engages in behavior that risks
injury to Gladys. Gladys will be entitled to monetary compensation
from Sheldon if injury does occur. Arlene purchases from Gladys
any future claims to monetary compensation for injury by Sheldon.
Now, if Sheldon injures Gladys, the monetary compensation will go
to Arlene. Arlene has thus purchased from Gladys the monetary
compensation component of her entitlement to freedom from tor-
tious injury by Sheldon. 110
We can now return to the two-party case. Here, the third party,
Arlene, is not involved. Rather, Sheldon purchases from Gladys any
future claims that Gladys might have against Sheldon himself for
tortious injury. In this two-party case, Sheldon, Party B, has
purchased from Gladys, Party A, the monetary component of her
entitlement to freedom from tortious injury by Sheldon. Thus Shel-
don, if he injures Gladys, will stand both as the injurer and as the
holder of the monetary compensation component. In sum, when-
ever a Transferred Claim rule exists, we know something about the
history of the relationship between the two parties: Party B, the
conflicting party, has bought the monetary compensation compo-
nent from Party A, the in-kind holder.
Transferred Claim rules would necessarily be limited to apply
only to unintentional transfers of the in-kind component, such as
component for the period of the rental. During that period, I also hold veto power, that
is, I can decline to transfer in-kind use back to the rental company during the period of
the rental agreement. I also hold the monetary compensation component: I could de-
mand monetary compensation in return for relinquishing in-kind use to the rental com-
pany prior to the expiration of the rental contract. The Transferred Claim rule, by
contrast, is the rule that governs my relations with the rental company when I return the
car, if I have bought a collision damage waiver. At the expiration of the rental, the
company is entitled to in-kind use. If I have damaged the car, however, then I cannot
render to the company the unimpaired in-kind enjoyment to which it is entitled. The
company holds no veto power: I am permitted to return the car damaged if I have
exercised due care to avoid damage. The company ordinarily would have a claim to
monetary compensation for the damage (the impairment of its in-kind use of the vehi-
cle). In this case, however, the company has no claim to monetary compensation be-
cause I have previously purchased the monetary compensation component from the
company by purchasing the collision damage waiver.
For a discussion of the possibilities for selling compensation claims to second and
third parties, see Robert Cooter, Towards a Market in Unmatured Tort Claims, 75 VA. L.
REV. 383 (1989); see also CharlesJ. Goetz, Commentary on "Towards a Market in Unmatured
Tort Claims": Collateral Implications, 75 VA. L. REV. 413 (1989) (commenting on Cooter
article); Alan Schwartz, Commentary on "Towards A Market in Unmatured Tort Claims.' A
Long Way Yet to Go, 75 VA. L. REV. 423 (1989) (same).
110 A variation on this arrangement is where Arlene purchases Gladys's claim after
Sheldon has already injured Gladys but before the damage award has been set.
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accidental automobile collisions. If intentional transfers were permit-
ted under Transferred Claim rules, then purchasing the monetary
compensation component would entitle the conflicting party to take
the in-kind component at will. Under such an arrangement, buying
the monetary compensation component would mean, in effect, buy-
ing both the monetary compensation component and the in-kind
use component.
Transferred Claim rules promote efficiency in two ways. First,
Transferred Claim rules, under certain circumstances, promote effi-
ciency by substituting first party insurance for more expensive third
party insurance. As Robert Cooter argues, "the market for UTCs
[unmatured tort claims] may... be... a superior vehicle for achiev-
ing tort law's two proclaimed goals-deterrence and insurance. If a
market in UTCs were established.... potential victims would substi-
tute cheaper first party insurance for the tort system's current third
party insurance scheme." 111
Second, Transferred Claim rules may promote efficiency by giv-
ing potential tort victims increased asset liquidity. As Alan Schwartz
has observed,
Before [a reform permitting widespread sale of UTCs], potential
victims own nothing of value regarding a possible accident; were
the reform enacted, they would own a UTC that could be turned
into cash. Removing the legal barrier to the sale of tort claims
thus creates gains for potential victims that are not offset by losses
elsewhere. [The] proposed reform therefore is efficient. 112
The case for the efficiency of Transferred Claim rules is clearest
where inherent or collateral deterrents-deterrents other than the
prospect of tort liability-operate as incentives to avoid transfers of
the in-kind use component. For instance, even though I have
bought a collision damage waiver for my rental car, I still have
strong incentives to avoid a crash. By contrast, where deterrents to
transfer are insufficient absent the prospect of tort liability (e.g., I am
deciding which safety devices to install in my factory), Transferred
Claim rules threaten to reduce efficiency through insufficient
deterrence." 13
111 Gooter, supra note 109, at 387-88.
112 Schwartz, supra note 109, at 425.
113 Robert Cooter responds to the insufficient deterrence problem by arguing that a
competitive market in UTCs would lead potential tortfeasors to undertake the appropri-
ate precautionary measures. A market in UTCs would be competitive, Cooter argues,
because not only the potential tortfeasor but also third parties would be permitted to
buy UTCs from potential victims. The competitive market for UTCs would be sensitive
to the risks of particular potential victims. Therefore, UTCs from high risk potential
victims would cost more than UTCs from low risk potential victims. For that reason, if I
plan to buy UTGs from my potential victims, I would seek to keep their risks low so that
their UTC prices would be low. As Cooter states, "competitive pricing of UTCs would
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In addition to the problems of underdeterrence that may un-
dermine the efficiency of Transferred Claim rules in some circum-
stances, problems of underpricing also may threaten to render
Transferred Claim rules inefficient in some contexts. Such under-
pricing problems would arise because people in some situations may
undervalue their UTCs. Such undervaluation would arise in con-
texts involving information imbalances (in which buyers know more
than sellers about the true value of UTCs) or involving irrational
discounting of UTCs by sellers (i.e., irrational underestimation of
the probability and severity of potential future injuries to
oneself).114
In sum, underdeterrence and underpricing may limit the effi-
ciency potential of Transferred Claim rules in some but not all cir-
cumstances. Where Transferred Claim rules operate optimally, they
may promote efficiency both by replacing costly third-party insur-
ance systems with cheaper first-party systems and by providing in-
creased liquidity of assets for potential tort victims.
Transferred Claim rules distribute less wealth to the in-kind
holder and more to the conflicting party than would any of the com-
result in appropriate deterrence of potential tortfeasors. Because the price of JTCs
should vary according to the likelihood and severity of potential torts, the potential
tortfeasor faced with purchasing the UJTG or risking litigation should take the optimal
amount of precaution." Gooter, supra note 109, at 387 (footnote omitted). That re-
sponse by Cooter has not fully satisfied all critics. See, e.g., Goetz, supra note 109, at 415-
16. Indeed, Cooter acknowledges that further work on this problem may be warranted.
Gooter, supra note 109, at 404.
Without wading further into the debate, suffice it to say that, even if the insufficient
deterrence problem may narrow the range of cases in which Transferred Claim rules will
foster efficiency, there will be at least some cases remaining where inherent and collat-
eral deterrents and/or competitive market factors will be sufficient to induce an efficient
level of precaution. Where those factors promoting due caution are sufficient, Trans-
ferred Claim rules may promote efficiency. The rental car collision damage waiver ap-
pears to be one example of such a case.
114 In response to the underpricing problem, Robert Cooter argues that a competi-
tive market in JTCs would result in appropriate UTC pricing, even in the presence of
information imbalances or irrational discounting by sellers. The supply and demand for
UTCs, Cooter maintains, would result in an equilibrium price for UTCs that would re-
flect their true value-that is, the value of the potential tort claims themselves (appropri-
ately discounted for time value, transaction costs, and the like). As Cooter states, "In a
brisk market for UTCs, interested classes of buyers, such as insurers and law firms,
should bid up the price of undervalued UTCs until they accurately reflect the expected
value of the underlying claims." Cooter, supra note 109, at 401.
Again, the critics are not fully satisfied with Cooter's response to the problem. See,
e.g., Schwartz, supra note 109. It may be that, in some circumstances, underpricing
problems will render Transferred Claim rules inefficient. For present purposes, how-
ever, what is relevant is that, in at least some situations (e.g., an adequately competitive
market, or a transaction involving a well-informed and rational seller), pricing will be
appropriate and Transferred Claim rules will foster efficiency. Again, the rental car col-
lision damage waiver is one example. No doubt rental companies are fully informed
about the probability and severity of collision damage to their cars and would not be
expected to discount irrationally the value of such potential damage.
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pensated transfer rules precisely because, under a Transferred
Claim rule, the in-kind holder is not entitled to compensation in the
event of an unintentional transfer of the in-kind component. Of
course, as they are generally conceived and as they have been dis-
cussed in this Article, Transferred Claim rules would come into be-
ing as a result of a compensated transfer to the conflicting party of a
monetary compensation component initially held by the in-kind
holder.11 5 The fair market price for that monetary compensation
component should equal the discounted value of the potential tort
claim. '1 6 Thus, while an existing Transferred Claim rule distributes
less wealth to the in-kind holder than would any of the regular com-
pensated transfer rules, for a new Transferred Claim rule to come into
existence, the in-kind holder must receive (or at least be entitled to
receive) compensation approximating the difference in value be-
tween a Transferred Claim rule and a Liability rule.
2. The Transferred Claim With Deductible Rule
The Transferred Claim With Deductible rule (cell ten) is in all
respects the same as the Transferred Claim rule except that in the
former, only part, rather than all, of the monetary compensation
component has been purchased by Party B. Under the Transferred
Claim With Deductible rule, Party A holds the in-kind use compo-
nent, Party B holds the only veto, and both A and B hold portions of
the monetary compensation component. In other words, only part
of the claim to monetary compensation has been transferred from
Party A to Party B.
Returning to the rental car example, a Transferred Claim With
Deductible rule would apply if, rather than purchasing a collision
damage waiver freeing me from all obligation to compensate for col-
lision (a Transferred Claim rule), I purchased a collision damage
waiver with a "deductible"-a portion of the full compensation
value for which I would remain obligated. If, having purchased a
collision damage waiver with a $250 deductible, I did $1000 of colli-
sion damage to the rental car, then I would owe $250 compensation
to the rental company (representing the $250 portion of the mone-
tary compensation component that the company retained). I would
not owe the company compensation for the remaining $750 of dam-
age because I had purchased, in the collision damage waiver, the
portion of the monetary compensation component relating to all
damage in excess of $250.
115 See, e.g., Cooter, supra note 109; Goetz, supra note 109; Schwartz, supra note 109.
116 See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
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Transferred Claim With Deductible rules promote efficiency in
the same ways as regular Transferred Claim rules, by substituting
first-party insurance for more expensive third-party insurance
and/or by increasing asset liquidity of potential tort victims. Trans-
ferred Claim With Deductible rules also provide, in the form of the
deductible, an incentive for Party B to avoid damage to the in-kind
component. In contexts in which inherent and collateral deterrents
are not sufficient to induce an efficient level of precaution in the
absence of tort liability, liability for the deductible may in some cir-
cumstances provide the necessary added deterrent to induce Party B
to take an efficient level of care. Using the rental car example, in-
herent deterrents (my regard for my own safety) may cause me to
take due care to avoid a crash, but they may not induce me to take
sufficient care to avoid, say, body damage to the rental car resulting
from falling debris at a construction site. My knowledge that I will
pay for the first $250 of any damage to the car, however, may induce
me to take an efficient level of precaution, perhaps by parking
outside the construction zone.
The Transferred Claim With Deductible rule may be seen as a
hybrid between the plain Transferred Claim rule (where Party B
may force a transfer for which Party A receives no compensation)
and the Liability rule (where B may force a transfer for which A re-
ceives full compensation). The Transferred Claim With Deductible
rule does not, like the Liability rule, ensure the deterrence of all but
efficient transfers by setting the compensation requirement at the
full value of the in-kind component, as determined by a court. It
does, however, provide some deterrence to transfer that in some
circumstances, when combined with inherent and collateral deter-
rents, may be sufficient to induce efficient levels of precaution.
The distributive effects of the Transferred Claim With Deducti-
ble rule are mixed. By splitting the monetary compensation compo-
nent, this rule distributes more wealth to the in-kind holder than
would a plain Transferred Claim rule, under which the in-kind
holder is entitled to no monetary compensation for transfer of the
in-kind component. By the same token, the price that the in-kind
holder would receive for the transfer of a portion of the monetary
compensation component to create a Transferred Claim With De-
ductible rule would presumably be a lower price than the in-kind
holder would receive for selling the full monetary component to cre-
ate a plain Transferred Claim rule.
3. The Transferred Claim Without Refusal Rule
As was true under the Transferred Claim rule (cell six), under
the Transferred Claim Without Refusal rule (cell eight), Party A
1993] 871
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
holds the in-kind enjoyment component and Party B holds the mon-
etary compensation component. The difference between the Trans-
ferred Claim and the Transferred Claim Without Refusal
entitlement forms is that, under the former, Party B holds the only
veto power, while under the latter, neither party holds veto power.
This difference means that, while only Party B could force a transfer
under a Transferred Claim rule, either party can force a transfer of
the in-kind component from A to B under a Transferred Claim
Without Refusal rule.
The Transferred Claim rule and the Transferred Claim Without
Refusal rule function equivalently except where Party A, the in-kind
holder, wishes to force an uncompensated transfer. 1 7 A Trans-
ferred Claim Without Refusal rule would allow A to force an uncom-
pensated transfer of the in-kind enjoyment component even against
the wishes of Party B, since under this rule B holds no veto. To
return to the rental car example, if I purchased a collision damage
waiver constituted as a Transferred Claim Without Refusal rule
(rather than as the usual Transferred Claim rule), then the rental
company could effect an uncompensated transfer of the in-kind
component to me whether I wanted it or not. Presumably, the
rental company would have little desire to give away cars in working
order. However, if I damaged the car beyond repair, then the rental
company might want to transfer the car to me for disposal.
To put the point differently, imagine that, by having a traffic
accident, I unintentionally transfer ninety percent of the in-kind use
component of the rental car from the rental company to myself; the
remaining ten percent is the car's carcass, scrap metal. Under a
plain Transferred Claim rule, I return the remaining ten percent of
the in-kind component to the rental company. (That is, since I may
transfer only unintentionally, I must return the ten percent of the
in-kind component that is left after the accident; and since I hold
veto power, the company cannot force me to take the junk heap.)
By contrast, under a Transferred Claim Without Refusal rule, the
rental company can force an uncompensated transfer to me of the
remaining ten percent of the in-kind use component, resulting in a
final one hundred percent of the in-kind component being trans-
ferred to me.
Presumably, in-kind holders would force uncompensated trans-
fers only in situations, such as the rental car example, in which part
117 I use the term "uncompensated" loosely here and throughout the discussions of
the various transferred claim entitlement forms. To be more precise, Party B, as both
the transferee and the holder of the monetary compensation component, would be both
the payor and the recipient of the compensation for Party A's relinquishment of the in-
kind use.
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of the in-kind component has already been transferred and the re-
siduum of the in-kind component has negative value (for instance,
merely represents a disposal cost). Thus, under a Transferred
Claim Without Refusal rule, Party B could unintentionally force an
uncompensated transfer (as in an accident), while Party A could in-
tentionally force an uncompensated transfer (as in the disposal
example).
The Transferred Claim Without Refusal rule would promote ef-
ficiency in certain ways that the plain Transferred Claim rule would
not. Under the Transferred Claim Without Refusal rule, the in-kind
holder (the rental company) presumably would not force an uncom-
pensated transfer unless the conflicting party had already trans-
ferred (through, say, collision damage) such a large part of the in-
kind use component that the remainder of the in-kind component
represented a net cost to its holder (a disposal cost for the wrecked
car, for example, that outweighed the value of what was left of the
in-kind component). The prospect of having disposal costs trans-
ferred to the conflicting party would provide an incentive for that
party to take efficient levels of precaution to avoid damage and to
minimize potential disposal costs.
The distributive implications of a Transferred Claim Without
Refusal rule are the same as those of a Transferred Claim rule, ex-
cept for the no-refusal aspect. That is, the Transferred Claim With-
out Refusal rule distributively favors Party B insofar as B is free from
liability for monetary compensation. And, as under the plain Trans-
ferred Claim rule, we may assume that Party B previously paid Party
A for the transfer of that monetary compensation component. The
distributive implications of the plain and "Without Refusal" Trans-
ferred Claim rules differ, however, with regard to the no-refusal as-
pect. Under the Without-Refusal rule, Party A, the in-kind holder,
can force an uncompensated transfer of the in-kind component to
Party B. Party A can thus transfer disposal costs to Party B. Again,
the rental company may transfer the wrecked car to me. That no-
refusal feature is distributively disadvantageous to Party B. Party B
presumably would therefore pay less to Party A to create a Trans-
ferred Claim Without Refusal rule than to create a plain Transferred
Claim rule.
4. The Transferred Claim With Deductible Without Refusal Rule
The Transferred Claim With Deductible Without Refusal rule
(cell twelve) is simply an amalgam of the foregoing three rules. It is
identical to the Transferred Claim Without Refusal rule except that,
under the Transferred Claim Without Refusal With Deductible rule,
1993] 873
874 CORNELL LA W REVIEW [Vol. 78:822
only part, rather than all, of the monetary compensation component
has been transferred from Party A to Party B.
The Transferred Claim With Deductible Without Refusal rule
combines the efficiency and distributive characteristics of the Trans-
ferred- Claim With Deductible and the Transferred Claim Without
Refusal rules. The Transferred Claim With Deductible Without Re-
fusal rule promotes efficiency in several ways. Like all transferred
claim rules, it substitutes first-party insurance for expensive third-
party insurance, and increases asset liquidity of potential tort vic-
tims. In addition, it provides dual incentives for Party B to avoid
transfers of the in-kind component by leaving B liable for payment
of a deductible (the With Deductible aspect), and allowing Party A
to transfer disposal costs to Party B (the Without Refusal aspect). 118
The Transferred Claim With Deductible Without Refusal rule
is, in two ways, more distributively favorable to the in-kind holder
than the plain Transferred Claim rule. First, the "With Deductible"
aspect entitles the in-kind holder to partial compensation, rather
118 The presence of the deductible in the Transferred Claim With Deductible With-
out Refusal rule would not be expected to affect the incidence of forced transfers by in-
kind holders. A deductible (using the term "deductible" broadly, to indicate any ar-
rangement in which each party holds part of the monetary compensation component)
may take one of three forms. The first type of deductible is a co-payment structure.
Here, Party B pays to Party A some constant proportion of the value of the in-kind trans-
fer-a co-payment. For instance, Party B could owe the in-kind holder 207 of the value
of any impairment (transfer) B causes to the in-kind use component. Under this first
design, the in-kind holder would not be expected to force transfers under ordinary cir-
cumstances because she would always receive only partial compensation, some percent-
age of the value of the transfer.
Under the second deductible design, Party B would owe Party A no compensation
for transfers of the in-kind component unless and until the value of the transfer (impair-
ment or damage) reached a certain level. Once that level were reached, B would pay A
the remaining value of the transfer. This design would operate as a cap on the potential
damage by Party B that Party A would be vulnerable to without compensation. Under
this second deductible design, the in-kind holder would not be expected to force trans-
fer under ordinary circumstances because the in-kind holder would receive either no
compensation (if the cap on the in-kind holder's vulnerability were not reached) or only
partial compensation (the in-kind holder would begin to receive compensation only after
sustaining some amount of uncompensated loss).
The third deductible design represents the most common meaning of a "deducti-
ble." Here, Party B owes Party A compensation for transfer value up to a set amount
and owes A no compensation for any transferred value above that amount. For example,
I owe the rental company only the first $250 worth of damage that I do to its rental car.
Under this third deductible design, an in-kind holder would be expected to force a trans-
fer only if she could limit the value of the transfer to an amount less than the deductible
amount and she expected a discrepancy in her favor to arise between the true value and
the appraised value of the transfer. That is, the in-kind holder would not be expected to
force a transfer unless she foresaw an error in the appraisal of the value transferred that
would result in overcompensation of her loss from the deductible funds. In the absence
of such a circumstance, the presence of the deductible would not be expected to affect
the propensity of in-kind holders to force transfers under the Transferred Claim With
Deductible Without Refusal rule.
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than no compensation. Second, the "Without Refusal" aspect al-
lows the in-kind holder to transfer disposal costs to Party B. By the
same token, we would expect the initial bargain between the parties
to reflect these distributive advantages: Party B would pay Party A
less money to create the Transferred Claim With Deductible Without
Refusal rule than she would pay to create another type of trans-
ferred claim rule.
Exploration of the four varieties of transferred claim rules-the
rules in which the monetary compensation component is held, in
full or in part, by the conflicting party-has revealed that these
seemingly odd entitlement forms may constitute the optimal struc-
turing of legal relations in circumstances in which some incidence of
unintentional transfer (accidental damage or injury) is to be ex-
pected. Under such circumstances, the four varieties of transferred
claim rules may serve to minimize the costs of insurance and to in-
crease the liquidity of potential victims' assets, while also providing
a range of incentives for actors to take efficient levels of precaution.
5. The Incoherent Cells
Cells five, seven, nine, and eleven are incoherent. In cell five,
Party A, the in-kind holder, holds a veto and Party B holds the mon-
etary compensation component. Cell nine is the same except that
the two parties together hold the monetary component. In cell
seven, Party A again holds the in-kind component, Party B holds the
monetary compensation component, and both parties hold veto
power. Cell eleven is the same as cell seven except, again, that the
two parties together hold the monetary compensation component.
None of these component combinations produce a coherent en-
titlement form. The monetary compensation component of an enti-
tlement cannot be allocated-in full or in part-to the conflicting
party if the in-kind holder also holds veto power. This is so because,
as we have seen, Party B can obtain the monetary compensation
component only by purchasing it from the in-kind holder. By
purchasing part or all of the monetary compensation component,
Party B becomes entitled to part or all of the monetary compensa-
tion to which the in-kind holder would otherwise have been entitled
in the event of relinquishment (or impairment) of the in-kind com-
ponent. If Party A, who has sold all or part of the monetary com-
pensation component, can then veto relinquishment of the in-kind
component, then presumably, A will always veto transfer (as long as
the in-kind component retains some positive value). This is so be-
cause, under these circumstances, A stands only to lose in-kind use
without equivalent compensation, since she is entitled to either no
compensation or only partial compensation, by permitting the trans-
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fer. 19 If Party A vetoes every, or virtually every, potential transfer,
then Party B's holding of the monetary compensation component is
meaningless. Thus, Party B can meaningfully hold the monetary
compensation component only if Party A holds no veto.' 20
C. Not for Love of Money: The Entitlement Forms Precluding
Compensation
As we have seen, entitlement forms that allocate the monetary
compensation component to the in-kind holder as well as the intui-
tively less obvious entitlement forms that allocate the monetary
component partly or fully to the conflicting party can foster effi-
ciency and distributive goals when applied in appropriate contexts.
We move now to the final set of entitlement forms, represented in
cells thirteen through sixteen, in which neither party holds a mone-
tary compensation component. Under these rules, no compensated
transfer of the in-kind component may occur.
These entitlement forms that prohibit compensated transfer are
valuable in contexts where the potential exchange of money would
exert an undue or inappropriate influence on transfer decisions.
They are also beneficial in contexts where compensation is not dis-
tributively desirable. Ease of exposition requires addressing this set
of entitlement forms in a different order from that in which they
appear on the table. The Uncompensated Taking rule will be con-
sidered first, followed by the Full Inalienability, Market Inalienabil-
ity With Refusal, Market Inalienability Without Refusal, and
Combined Uncompensated Taking and Market Inalienability With-
out Refusal rules.
1. The Uncompensated Taking Rule
The Uncompensated Taking rule (cell fourteen) is perhaps the
most counterintuitive entitlement form of all, and yet it is widely
used. Under this rule, Party A holds only the in-kind component.
Party B holds the sole veto power, and neither party holds a mone-
tary component. Thus, Party B can force a transfer of the in-kind
119 It is true that Party A could refrain from vetoing the transfer as a way of giving a
gift to Party B. That is, A, by not vetoing relinquishment, could allow B to collect mone-
tary compensation. But in situations where Party A wishes to make a gift to Party B, it is
unlikely that B would have purchased the monetary compensation component from A at
the outset rather than simply allowing Party A to make a gift directly to Party B.
120 For the reasons stated, cells five, seven, nine, and eleven appear to be incoher-
ent. It is possible, however, that the component distributions in those cells do represent
coherent entitlement forms that I have failed to identify. My colleague, Tom Rowe, has
helped me to make sense of several transferred-claim entitlement forms that at first ap-
peared incoherent. It would not be surprising if better sense could eventually be made
of the component distributions in cells five, seven, nine, and eleven as well.
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enjoyment component from Party A, who lacks veto power, without
paying him compensation (since no monetary compensation compo-
nent exists). The Uncompensated Taking rule is like the Liability
and Transferred Claim rules insofar as, under all three rules, the
conflicting party holds the only veto power and may therefore force
a transfer of the in-kind component. Under the Uncompensated
Taking rule, however, that forced transfer is uncompensated since
neither party holds a monetary compensation component. By con-
trast, under the Liability rule, the transfer is compensated since the
in-kind holder holds the monetary component. And under the
Transferred Claim rule also, the transfer is "compensated,"
although the compensation does not go to the in-kind holder.' 21
Although it may not appear so at first blush, the Uncompen-
sated Taking rule is a form of entitlement. It is distinguished from a
non-entitlement by the fact that Party A does hold the in-kind enjoy-
ment component. Of course, since Party A does not hold a veto or a
monetary compensation component, Party B can take the in-kind
use component from Party A without compensation. But a court will
not enjoin A's in-kind enjoyment-unless and until B has trans-
ferred the in-kind component. Party A's entitlement thus consists
precisely in legal permission to enjoy in-kind use, but without any
guarantee of non-transfer by Party B. The Uncompensated Taking
rule is, thus, a thin form of entitlement, to be sure. Nonetheless, the
rule constitutes a legal liberty, distinct from a non-entitlement, inso-
far as, under the rule, a court will permit, if not protect, Party A's in-
kind use.
Since Uncompensated Taking rules provide that the conflicting
party may take in-kind use without paying compensation, it is not
surprising that these rules are used only in narrowly defined circum-
stances. The two contexts in which Uncompensated Taking rules
are generally found are: confiscation-for-cause and non-negligent
injury.
An example of an Uncompensated Taking rule designed to pro-
vide for confiscation-for-cause is a criminal forfeiture provision.
Various criminal statutes provide for the confiscation of property
121 Even though the compensation money would not go to the in-kind holder under
the Transferred Claim rule, the Uncompensated Taking entitlement form is to be distin-
guished from the Transferred Claim rule. Under a Transferred Claim rule, Party B actu-
ally holds the monetary component. After Sheldon has purchased from Gladys any
future tort claims she may have against him (by purchasing her monetary compensation
component), Sheldon, theoretically, may sell that monetary component back to Gladys
or to a third party who will now receive any future tort damages awarded to Gladys
against Sheldon. This situation is entirely distinct from what would obtain under an
Uncompensated Taking rule in which no monetary compensation component is held by
any party.
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used in the commission of a crime. Florida law, for example, pro-
vides that any equipment used to poach alligators will be confis-
cated. 122 Thus, under Florida law, when a person is convicted of
alligator poaching, she loses the power to veto transfer of in-kind
use of implicated equipment, and she loses any claim to monetary
compensation for relinquishing in-kind use. The state may force an
uncompensated transfer 123 under these circumstances.
Another example of an Uncompensated Taking rule designed
to provide for confiscation-for-cause is the rule governing involun-
tary termination of parental custody for lack of parental fitness. Or-
dinarily, custody is governed by a Market Inalienability With Refusal
rule: 124 the parent may give, but may not sell, custody to a willing
taker. However, if the condition of parental unfitness occurs, then
the Uncompensated Taking rule governs. That is, upon a finding of
unfitness, the custodian loses the power to veto a transfer of in-kind
enjoyment of custody.' 25 The unfit parent thus holds the in-kind
component, but no veto power or monetary compensation compo-
nent. Therefore, the government may, at its discretion, force an un-
compensated transfer of custody.' 26
The second and somewhat broader context in which Uncom-
pensated Taking rules are found is non-negligent injury. 1 27 If you
unintentionally injure me even though you were exercising all due
and reasonable care, then (assuming that you are not strictly liable)
you owe me no compensation. If you are permitted to thus uninten-
tionally and non-negligently injure me (impair my in-kind enjoy-
ment of, say, my health) without my consent (I hold no veto), but
you owe me no compensation (I hold no monetary compensation
component), then my health entitlement, under these limited condi-
122 The statute provides:
It is unlawful to intentionally kill.., an alligator .... Any person who
violates this section is guilty of a felony .... Any equipment, including
but not limited to weapons, vehicles, boats, and lines, used by a person in
the commission of a violation ... shall, upon conviction of such person,
be'confiscated ....
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 372.663(1) (West Supp. 1993); see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 77.12.101(1) (West Supp. 1993) (providing for forfeiture of contraband wildlife and
related equipment).
123 I say "may force" rather than "must force" because I assume that there is
prosecutorial discretion in the enforcement of the forfeiture provision.
124 The Market Inalienability With Refusal rule is discussed below. See infra notes
142-49 and accompanying text.
125 See, e.g., Wilson v. Wilson, 153 S.E.2d 349 (N.C. 1967) (placing the child with a
state agency when both parents were found unfit); In re Douglas, 164 N.E.2d 475 (Ohio
Juv. Ct. 1959) (same).
126 The government has discretion because it holds veto power-the parent cannot
force the government to take custody.
127 This category includes non-negligent injury of all kinds, including bodily injury
and economic injury.
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tions, is constructed as an Uncompensated Taking form of
entitlement.
Uncompensated Taking rules that allow non-negligent injuries
to go uncompensated apply pervasively in the realm of economic
competition.' 28 For example, when, by providing widgets at a lower
price than I do, you take over my share of the widget market, you
harm me but owe me no compensation. In that economic competi-
tion context, I am entitled only to in-kind use: the court will not
enjoin my enjoyment of my market share. But I hold no veto power
and no monetary compensation component. Thus, I cannot stop
you from taking my market share, nor can I demand monetary com-
pensation for market share that you do take. 129
Uncompensated Taking rules contribute to efficiency in the
contexts both of non-negligent injury and of confiscation-for-cause.
Uncompensated Taking rules promote efficiency in cases of non-
negligent injury by allowing costs to lie where they fall. In the con-
text of non-negligent injuries, cost-shifting increases administrative
costs but has no deterrence value. Efficiency is not fostered by de-
128 Yet another area in which Uncompensated Taking rules apply to non-negligent
injuries is governmental regulation. Regulatory schemes often restrict in-kind use and
thereby injure in-kind holders, but in many cases no compensation is due to those in-
jured parties. See generally Jeb Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077 (1993) (describing
American "takings" jurisprudence).
129 An Uncompensated Taking rule thus applies in the economic competition con-
text when market share is taken in a permitted manner. If, on the other hand, market
share were to be taken in a forbidden manner, say, through predatory pricing, then a
different rule (a Full Inalienability rule) would apply, and the transfer in question would
be forbidden. PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTrrRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION, Vol. III § 711 (1978).
The Uncompensated Taking rule in some circumstances bears resemblance to a
Hohfeldian privilege, but it is distinct from a Hohfeldian privilege in the following way.
Under an Uncompensated Taking rule, a transfer of the in-kind component from Party A
to Party B is contemplated. But contrast, under a Hohfeldian privilege structure, both
parties have continuing legally sanctioned access to in-kind use-no transfer is involved.
Thus, when a confiscation for cause occurs under an Uncompensated Taking rule (say
my poaching equipment is confiscated), Party A no longer has any entitlement at all-the
in-kind use component is now held by Party B, and Party A has no further legally sanc-
tioned access to it. This situation is quite different from that contemplated in the
Hohfeldian privilege in which both parties retain continuing legally-sanctioned access.
Once the transfer has been made, under an Uncompensated Taking rule, the ques-
tion arises as to what form of entitlement the new in-kind holder has. For example,
where the sate confiscates my poaching equipment, it now holds that equipment under a
Property rule. By contrast, when you take my market share, you hold it under an Un-
compensated Taking rule (so I am free to win that market share back, if I can). The
latter case, where the new in-kind holder holds under an Uncompensated Taking rule,
most closely resembles the Hohfeldian privilege, since both parties are continuously
permitted to attempt to avail themselves of in-kind use. But the Uncompensated Taking
rule is not limited to that sort of case and, indeed, the new in-kind holder after an un-
compensated transfer could hold the in-kind component under any of the fourteen enti-
tlement forms. For a history of legal theory regarding the existence and significance of
"thin" entitlements, see Singer, supra note 7, at 1025-59.
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terrence of non-negligent behavior. Where the reasonable level of
care to avoid injury is taken, it would, by definition, not be reason-
able to demand a higher level of care. If the law required monetary
compensation for injuries resulting from non-negligent activities,
then non-negligent actors might reduce activity to inefficiently low
levels to avoid liability. Where reasonable care is taken, the inci-
dence of injury would not be inefficiently high.' 30 Thus, where the
actor takes reasonable care and causes injury, requiring the injurer
to compensate the in-kind holder would not foster efficiency. In
such cases, an Uncompensated Taking rule serves efficiency
purposes.
In the confiscation-for-cause context, the Uncompensated Tak-
ing rule fosters efficiency in a different way. Here, when an in-kind
holder uses the in-kind component in a prohibited manner, that in-
kind component may be confiscated. The efficiency value of the Un-
compensated Taking rule in the confiscation-for-cause context lies
both in the fact that confiscation incapacitates the in-kind holder
from further illicit use of the in-kind component, and in the deter-
rence of illicit use that is provided by the threat of confiscation.
The Uncompensated Taking rule obviously distributes less
wealth to the in-kind holder, and more to the conflicting party, than
any other entitlement form. Under this rule, the in-kind holder
holds in-kind enjoyment only at the pleasure of the conflicting
party, and is entitled to no compensation for relinquishing in-kind
enjoyment. In addition, unlike the various transferred claim rules,
the Uncompensated Taking rule does not imply a previous compen-
sated transfer of the monetary compensation component.
Considerations of distributive justice may militate against use of
Uncompensated Taking rules in some contexts. For example,
where two non-negligent actors are involved in a situation resulting
in injury to one, it may be unfair to let all the costs of injury lie
where they fall. By contrast, in the confiscation-for-cause context,
the distributive disadvantage to the in-kind holder is better justified
since the confiscation is, after all, for cause.
Thus we see that an entitlement form even as peculiar and thin
as the Uncompensated Taking rule may actually be a valuable struc-
ture for legal relations in a certain range of contexts. Where a so-
cially desirable activity will predictably result in some rate of non-
negligent injuries, or where an in-kind holder handles the in-kind
component in a prohibited manner, use of the Uncompensated Tak-
ing rule may best serve efficiency and distributive goals.
130 See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970) (discussing theo-
retical bases of tort law).
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2. The Market Inalienability With Refusal Rule and the Full
Inalienability Rule
Remaining within the set of entitlement forms that precludes
compensated transfers, we now leave the Uncompensated Taking
rule and proceed to consider the entitlement forms that permit un-
compensated transfers only with the consent of the in-kind holder,
and the entitlement form that allows no transfers at all, compen-
sated or otherwise.
Cell fifteen represents two possible rules. The Market Inaliena-
bility With Refusal rule (fifteen I) assumes that both parties have
initiation choice. The Full Inalienability rule (fifteen II) assumes
that, while both parties have repose power, neither party has initia-
tion power. For ease of exposition, Full Inalienability (fifteen II)
will be addressed before Market Inalienability With Refusal (fifteen
I).
a. The Full Inalienability Rule
The Full Inalienability rule (fifteen II) is distinguished from all
other entitlement forms by the fact that this rule prohibits any trans-
fer, compensated or otherwise, of the in-kind use component.
Under the Full Inalienability rule, Party A holds the in-kind compo-
nent, neither party holds the monetary component, each party holds
a veto power,' 3 ' and neither party holds initiation choice (since
neither party may initiate transfer). Examples of this rule include
the prohibitions against transferring one's vote in a federal elec-
tion13 2 and against selling oneself into slavery.' 33
Where a particular transfer would create costs to third parties
(externalities) that exceed the value of the transfer itself, prohibiting
the transfer through use of a Full Inalienability rule may foster effi-
ciency. If a particular transfer would create costs to third parties
and it is clear a priori that the sum required to compensate those
third parties would exceed the value generated by the transfer, then
simply prohibiting the transfer will be more efficient than futilely
expending energy quantifying the compensation that would be
owed to the third parties. In this situation, where it is clear in ad-
vance that the value of the transfer is insufficient to justify its costs
including its externality costs, applying a Full Inalienability rule ab
131 This veto power exists in a constrained form insofar as veto is required rather
than merely permitted: if one party (illegitimately) initiated a prohibited transfer of the
in-kind component, the other party would have an obligation to veto that transfer.
132 See 18 U.S.C. § 597 (1988) (providing penalties for any person who "makes or
offers to make an expenditure to any person.., to vote for or against any candidate" or
who "solicits, accepts, or receives any such expenditure in consideration of his vote").
133 See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII, § 1.
19931
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initio will foster efficiency by precluding the inefficient transfer with-
out wasting resources establishing a negotiated or collectively-set
price that will never be paid.18 4
Moralisms, a special type of externality, are of particular impor-
tance in the full inalienability context. A moralism is the cost in of-
fense to the moral sensitivities of third parties caused by a
transfer.13 5 For instance, my knowledge that you have sold yourself
into slavery may cause me pain, which constitutes an externality to
your transaction with your new "owner."
Calabresi and Melamed contend that, where third-party costs
are moralisms, they are not amenable to collective valuation. They
maintain that, because no price may be collectively established for
those third-party interests-and since, by hypothesis, transaction
costs preclude individual price negotiations with the numerous
third-parties-the third-party costs of moralisms must either be ig-
nored, or else the entitlement in question must be constructed as
fully inalienable.13 6
It is not clear to me that the cost of a moralism could never be
quantified collectively in monetary terms. But we need not resolve
that question here. Rather, it suffices to say that, if a particular mor-
alism were of sufficient weight (measured in some monetary or non-
monetary way) to make it clear in advance that the transaction in
question would be inefficient, then efficiency would be facilitated by
precluding the offending transaction through use of a Full Inaliena-
bility rule. In sum, then, use of Full Inalienability rules may foster
efficiency in situations where it is clear a priori that a transfer would
be inefficient once all externalities (including moralisms) were ac-
counted for.
In addition to promoting efficiency in some situations involving
externalities, Full Inalienability rules may also be used to promote
efficiency in some situations involving paternalism and self-paternal-
ism.1 3 7 If we believe that a particular person or class of persons
(minors, for example, or persons vulnerable to coercion or, in the
case of self-paternalism, oneself in a foreseeable moment of tempta-
tion) will effect a self-harmful and inefficient transfer, 138 then we
134 Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 4, at 1111.
135 Id. at 1112.
136 Id.
137 See Andrew Koppelman, Forced Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of Abortion, 84
Nw. U. L. REV. 480, 495-503 (1990) (stating that inalienability rules are appropriate
where power inequalities create danger of coerced "contracts").
138 The act in question is self-harmful and inefficient if the harm to self is not out-
weighed by a benefit to others.
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may use a Full Inalienability rule to preclude the harmful transac-
tion and thereby maximize efficiency.'5 9
The Full Inalienability rule generally distributes less wealth to
the in-kind holder than would an entitlement form permitting com-
pensated transfers. The in-kind holder who, under the Full Inalien-
ability rule, may not transfer the in-kind component will be poorer
than she would be were she allowed to sell in-kind use.140 Full ina-
lienability may also distribute less wealth to the in-kind holder than
would an entitlement form permitting only uncompensated trans-
fers. This would be so if the in-kind holder valued the autonomy to
give away the in-kind component. On the other hand, if we were to
subscribe to the paternalist thesis that in-kind holders will some-
times give away in-kind use and later regret it, then we also would
believe that, in some cases, Full Inalienability rules actually dis-
tribute more wealth to the in-kind holder than would rules permit-
ting transfer.
A midpoint between the Full Inalienability rule, prohibiting all
transfers, and the entitlement forms permitting compensated trans-
fers is the group of entitlement forms that permit only uncompen-
sated transfers. In addition to the Uncompensated Taking rule,
discussed above, this group of entitlement forms includes a variety
of "market inalienability" rules, to be considered presently.
b. The Market Inalienability With Refusal Rule
The Market Inalienability With Refusal rule (fifteen I) is the first
of the Market Inalienability rules. Under this rule, Party A may give,
but may not sell, the in-kind use component to Party B. And Party B
may refuse the gift. Under this rule, Party A holds the in-kind com-
ponent, each party holds initiation choice and veto power, and
neither party holds a monetary compensation component. This rule
resembles the Property rule in that transfer can occur only with the
consent of both parties (since both hold veto power). The differ-
ence between the two rules is that, while the Property rule contem-
plates compensated transfer, the Market Inalienability With Refusal
rule contemplates only uncompensated transfer since neither party
holds a monetary compensation component.' 41 An example of this
139 It is interesting to note that, while self-paternalism may be consistent with the
Coasian principle that, absent transaction costs, individuals will bargain to efficient out-
comes by striking mutually advantageous bargains, true paternalism departs from that
principle, by maintaining that some persons will strike bargains disadvantageous to
themselves. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 4, at 1113-14.
140 This assumes that the price offered would exceed the value of in-kind use to the
holder.
141 For a valuable exploration of the significance and merits of market inalienability,
see MargaretJane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1849 (1987).
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rule is the law of most states on organ donation: I may give you, but
may not sell to you, my kidney, and you may accept or decline the
gift.' 4 2
The prohibition on compensation for transfer under the Market
Inalienability With Refusal rule obviously precludes operation of
the most usual facilitator of efficiency, the use of negotiated prices.
The use of negotiated prices that reflect the value of the in-kind
component to each of these parties assures that transfers occur only
where in-kind use is ultimately held by the party who most values it.
Under a Market Inalienability rule, no price markers indicate the
value of in-kind use to either party.
Assuming that in-kind use has some positive net value to Party
A, the in-kind holder, any uncompensated transfer must represent
an act of altruism by A. We may therefore predict that not every
available efficient transfer will occur under this rule. Yet Market In-
alienability may promote efficiency overall if some classes of in-kind
holders would be excessively swayed by the prospect of receiving
monetary compensation for relinquishing in-kind use, or if some
compensated transfers would create externalities that uncompen-
sated transfers would not. Thus, Market Inalienability With Refusal
rules may promote efficiency in three sorts of circumstances: where
paternalism or self-paternalism is a motivating factor; where we
want to maximize truthfulness by in-kind holders because the in-
kind holder has crucial but unverifiable information; and, where cer-
tain types of third-party moralisms exist.
Regarding paternalism, if in-kind holders, because of the mo-
mentary appeal of monetary reward, make sales they later regret (as
have some individuals who have sold their kidneys, for example), 143
then those transactions may, in the long run, turn out to have been
inefficient, to have created more cost than value.' 44 In such situa-
tions, paternalism and self-paternalism toward in-kind holders may
motivate market inalienability policies.
The second circumstance in which Market Inalienability With
Refusal rules will promote efficiency arises when we wish to maxi-
mize truth-telling by in-kind holders because they possess crucial
but non-verifiable information. Blood donation provides an exam-
142 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 367f (West 1988); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 48.02
(West 1989).
143 See generally ROBERTA G. SIMMONS ET AL., GIFT OF LIFE: THE SOCIAL AND PSYCHO-
LOGICAL IMPACT OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION 233-85 (1977) (discussing the decision to
become a donor).
144 For an argument to this effect, see, e.g., RICHARD M. TrrMuss, THE GIFT RELA-
TIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY (1971); cf. KennethJ. Arrow, Gits and
Exchanges, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 343, 355-56 (1972) (discussing Titmuss' work on this
point).
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ple of this sort of circumstance. Transfusion of tainted blood may
result in hepatitis or Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) infec-
tion in the recipient. At present, there exists no fully reliable test
for determining whether the blood of a particular donor is infected
with HIV or with one sort of hepatitis.' 45 Yet the potential donor
(the in-kind holder of the blood) knows whether he is infected or
has engaged in behavior elevating the risk of infection. In this situa-
tion, use of a Market Inalienability With Refusal rule would be ex-
pected to reduce the incidence of transmission of HIV and hepatitis
through blood transfusions. If monetary compensation were paid
for blood transfers, then the in-kind holder, the only one with relia-
ble information on the matter, would have an incentive to lie about
whether his blood were or might be infected. Conversely, if no
compensation were paid for blood donations, then the only remain-
ing motive for giving blood would be altruism, in which case the in-
kind holder would not be expected to lie about the likelihood that
his blood were infected. 146 Where such informational imbalances
exist, Market Inalienability With Refusal rules may foster efficient
outcomes.
Of course, not all information imbalances are appropriately
corrected for through Market Inalienability With Refusal rules. Su-
san Rose-Ackerman points out that information imbalances exist in,
for example, the used car market, where sellers presumably know
more about the condition and history of particular cars than do buy-
ers.' 47 Yet we do not solve that information imbalance problem by
prohibiting compensated transfers of used cars. In the used-car
context, the value of allowing compensated transfers exceeds the
costs created by the attendant incentives to withhold information.
Thus, market inalienability may or may not be a desirable response
to an information imbalance, depending on the costs and benefits
involved in a particular context.
145 The available tests for HIV in blood detect the presence of HIV only where in-
fection has occurred at least four to six weeks before the test. Therefore, to avoid col-
lecting blood that is infected but that tests negative, blood banks must rely upon truthful
answers from potential donors to questions regarding behaviors that heighten the risk of
infection. Interview with Teresa Pleasants, Education Specialist for American Red Cross
Blood Services, in Durham, N.C. (Nov. 21, 1991). As to hepatitis infection, reliable tests
are now available for all forms of hepatitis except a subset of the cases of Non-A, Non-B
hepatitis. Blood banks must rely on donor truthfulness to avoid banking blood infected
with that subset of Non-A, Non-B hepatitis. See Non-A, Non-B Hepatitis, 2 THE LANCET
1077 (1984).
146 For an empirical and theoretical comparative study of compensated and uncom-
pensated blood banking systems, see TrrMuss, supra note 144; see also Arrow, supra note
144 (commenting on Titmuss' work).
147 Rose-Ackerman, supra note 29, at 948.
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The presence of compensation-sensitive moralisms constitutes
the third circumstance in which Market Inalienability With Refusal
rules may promote efficiency. A moralism, again, is the cost in of-
fense to the moral sensitivities of third parties caused by a transfer.
Some third parties may be offended by certain compensated trans-
fers, but not offended by uncompensated transfers of the same in-
kind goods. Such compensation-sensitive moralisms presumably
stem from the third-party's intuition that the prospect of monetary
compensation is exercising undue influence on the seller in a way
that is tragic or intolerable and that perhaps is also unethical for the
buyer to exploit. Such a compensation-sensitive moralism seems
implicit in Richard Titmuss' statement that
[t]he commercialization of blood and donor relationships ... re-
sults in situations in which proportionately more and more blood
is supplied by the poor, the unskilled, the unemployed, Negroes
and other low income groups, and categories of exploited human
populations of high blood yielders. Redistribution in terms of
blood and blood products from the poor to the rich appears to be
one of the dominant effects of American blood-banking
systems. 148
Where compensation-sensitive moralisms constitute externalities to
compensated transfers that render those transfers inefficient (i.e.,
where the externality costs combined with any other costs exceed
the total benefits of the transfer), Market Inalienability With Refusal
rules may foster efficiency.
In sum, Market Inalienability With Refusal rules may promote
efficiency in several ways. Where individual short-sightedness, in-
formation imbalances, and compensation-sensitive moralisms, alone
or in combination, may render compensated transfers inefficient, a
Market Inalienability With Refusal Rule may be efficiency-
enhancing.
Like the Full Inalienability rule, the Market Inalienability With
Refusal rule generally distributes less wealth to the in-kind holder
than would a rule permitting compensated transfers. The prohibi-
tion of sale distributes wealth away from the in-kind holder if, as a
result of that prohibition, she either keeps the in-kind component
when she would have preferred to sell it or else gives the in-kind
component to the conflicting party when she would have preferred
to sell it.149
148 Titmuss, supra note 144, at 245-46.
149 An example is found in the blood banking context. While Market Inalienability
With Refusal rules may promote efficiency in this context, see supra notes 145-46, 148
and accompanying text, market inalienability may tend to distribute wealth away from
the poor. While under a compensated blood-banking system, a poor individual might
choose to sell his or her blood, under market inalienability, that individual would be
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The only exception to the observation that a sale prohibition
generally distributes wealth away from in-kind holders arises where,
because of the sale prohibition, an in-kind holder declines to make a
transfer that she would have consented to in exchange for compensa-
tion but would have later regretted. In such a case, the no-sale rule
would actually distribute wealth to the in-kind holder by leaving her,
in the long run, with the more highly valued good, rather than with
the less highly valued compensation.
3. The Market Inalienability Without Refusal Rule
The second of the market inalienability rules, the Market Ina-
lienability Without Refusal rule (cell thirteen), is like the Market Ina-
lienability With Refusal rule, just discussed, insofar as both rules
allow the in-kind holder to give but not to sell the in-kind compo-
nent. The two rules differ, however, with regard to veto power.
Under the Market Inalienability Without Refusal rule, only Party A,
the in-kind holder, holds veto power. For that reason, under this
rule, the in-kind holder can force an uncompensated transfer of the
in-kind enjoyment component; Party B cannot refuse the "gift."
Examples of the Market Inalienability Without Refusal rule are
not common. This rule, however, could be useful in contexts such
as child custody. Under the law of most states, the government is
not formally required to take custody of children whom parents wish
to place for adoption. 150 But we can imagine an amendment to a
state's laws that would require the state to take custody when custo-
dians request that the state do so. Such legislation would be based
on the supposition that custodians who express to the relevant state
agencies their inability or unwillingness to maintain custody may, if
they are forced to retain custody, be more likely than other custodi-
ans to neglect or abuse their children. 15 1
It is not difficult to imagine a situation that would raise the
question of giving custodians power to mandate governmental cus-
tody. Imagine, for instance, that a particular state director of social
services believed that, by and large, parents-even troubled or un-
permitted to give away but not to sell his or her blood. Calabresi and Melamed illustrate
this point with the example of adoption: "Prohibiting the sale of babies makes poorer
those who can cheaply produce babies and richer those who through some nonmarket
device get free an 'unwanted' baby." Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 4, at 1114.
150 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 1104, 1108 (1981 & Supp. 1992); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 625.040-.080 (Baldwin 1987). In practice, states virtually always take cus-
tody of children when requested to do so.
151 This fear of increased abuse and neglect rates is, presumably, one reason that
states currently do take custody of children when they are asked to, even though they are
not legally required to do so. Indeed, the virtual certainty in practice that a state will
take custody may largely explain why no such legal obligation has been legislated; the
issue has not arisen because states do not decline custody.
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willing parents-are better custodians of their children than would
be the state. Acting on that belief, this director of social services
refused parents' requests to have the state take custody of, say, a
dozen children in one year. A year later it was revealed that some of
those children had been injured or had died from abuse or neglect.
Under these circumstances, the state legislature might well enact
legislation requiring the state, at least in certain circumstances, to
take custody of children whose custodians request that it do so.
Such legislation would constitute a Market Inalienability Without
Refusal rule; the custodian, Party A, would hold the in-kind compo-
nent and the only veto power, but no monetary component. Thus,
the custodian could not sell in-kind custody of the child, but could
give custody to the state. The state, holding no veto power, could
not refuse the "gift" (the transfer of custody). Thus, the parent
would hold a right to choose (without receiving compensation for
either choice) between two options regarding the posture of the in-
kind component: retention of custody or transfer of custody to the
government.152
The Market Inalienability Without Refusal rule may foster effi-
ciency in certain situations in which the With Refusal version would
not suffice. Market Inalienability Without Refusal rules would have
the same benefits as Market Inalienability With Refusal rules insofar
as both avoid the problematic incentives and attitudes that permit-
ting compensation might generate. At the same time, the Without-
Refusal variant facilitates taking into account two potentially con-
flicting values which must be balanced in a given situation, and al-
lows the in-kind holder alone to strike that balance.
In the custody example, the second and potentially conflicting
value (besides the value of the parent's custodial rights) is the wel-
fare of the child. By allowing the parent to force a transfer of cus-
tody to the government, the Market Inalienability Without Refusal
152 Actually, one or both of the in-kind options available under a Market Inalienabil-
ity Without Refusal rule entitlement could be treated as market inalienable. That is, one
or both of the in-kind holder's options regarding the posture of the in-kind component
could be permitted to be given away, but not sold. We have discussed in the custody
example a Market Inalienability Without Refusal entitlement in which the prohibition on
compensated transfer applies to both of the in-kind options, that is, where the holder is
prohibited from accepting compensation for relinquishing either one of the mutually
exclusive options regarding the posture of the in-kind component. But one can also
imagine a Market Inalienability Without Refusal entitlement in which compensation is
prohibited for choosing one, but not the other option. For instance, returning to the
custody example, a parent might be prohibited from selling custody and yet be permit-
ted to accept compensation in return for retaining in-kind custody (where, for example,
the custodian's reason for enforcing her right to require the government to take custody
would have been financial inability to support the child). Thus, we could construct Mar-
ket Inalienability Without Refusal rules such that relinquishment of either both or only
one of the in-kind options would be non-compensable.
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rule obviates the risk that the child will be neglected or abused by an
entitlement-holder who does not want custody but cannot transfer
it. The "Without Refusal" aspect of this Market Inalienability rule
assures that there will always be a party available to take custody of
the child. The Market Inalienability Without Refusal rule leaves it
to the in-kind holder-who presumably has the most information on
the situation-to weigh the costs and benefits of retaining and of
transferring the in-kind component, and to choose, without influ-
ence of compensation, between those two options.
The distributive implications of the Market Inalienability With-
out Refusal rule are largely the same as those of the Market Inalien-
ability With Refusal rule. We may generally assume that, because
both rules prohibit compensated transfer, less wealth is distributed
to the in-kind holder than would be under a rule permitting com-
pensated transfer. The only case in which that distributive assump-
tion would not hold is where an in-kind holder, unduly swayed by
the prospect of monetary compensation, would sell in-kind use but
later regret it. In such a case, the paternalistic market inalienability
rules would be distributively more favorable to the in-kind holder
than compensated transfer rules because the former would protect
the in-kind holder from impoverishing herself through poor
judgment.
The distributive implications of the Market Inalienability With-
out Refusal rule differ from those of the With Refusal version insofar
as the no-refusal aspect, the ability of the in-kind holder to force an
uncompensated transfer, may be advantageous to the in-kind holder
in some instances. Retaining the in-kind component may, for in-
stance, entail maintenance or disposal costs. Because holding the
in-kind use component may sometimes result in costs rather than
benefits, the Market Inalienability Without Refusal rule distributes
more wealth to the in-kind holder than does the Market Inalienabil-
ity With Refusal rule.
4. The Combined Uncompensated Taking and Market Inalienability
Without Refusal Rule
The Combined Uncompensated Taking and Market Inalienabil-
ity Without Refusal rule (cell sixteen), the last of the fourteen forms
of entitlement, combines the features of the Market Inalienability
Without Refusal rule and the Uncompensated Taking rule to pro-
duce a surprisingly useful entitlement form. Under this Combined
rule, Party A holds the in-kind component, and neither party holds a
veto power or a monetary compensation component. Therefore,
either party can force an uncompensated transfer.
1993] 889
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
An example of the Combined Uncompensated Taking and Mar-
ket Inalienability Without Refusal rule can be readily generated by
combining the custody rules described in the discussions of the Un-
compensated Taking and the Market Inalienability Without Refusal
rules. Under the Uncompensated Taking rule, the government may
force, upon a finding of parental unfitness, an uncompensated trans-
fer of custody from the parent to the government. The parent, how-
ever, may not force such a transfer because the government holds
veto power. Under the Market Inalienability Without Refusal rule,
the parent may force an uncompensated transfer of custody to the
government, but the government may not force transfer because the
parent holds veto power. Under the Combined rule, neither party
holds veto power, and thus either party can force an uncompensated
transfer of custody to the government. Either the government
(upon a finding of unfitness) or the parent would be able to force an
uncompensated transfer of custody to the government if custody
were governed by a Combined Uncompensated Taking and Market
Inalienability Without Refusal rule.
The efficiency value of the Combined Uncompensated Taking
and Market Inalienability Without Refusal rule arises in contexts in
which the object of the entitlement (e.g., the child, in the custody
context) is an appropriate locus of societal protection. Returning to
the child custody example, by allowing that either party (the parent
or the government) may force an uncompensated transfer of the in-
kind component (custody of the child), the probability is heightened
that the welfare of the object of the entitlement (the child) will be
maximized. If the government can take custody of the child upon a
finding of parental unfitness, then the chances of maltreatment of
the child are reduced. By the same token, if a parent can force cus-
tody upon the government, then, again, the chances of inadequate
care of the child are reduced. The prohibition on compensation for
the transfer removes pecuniary influences from the parties' deci-
sionmaking processes, thereby maximizing the probability that the
welfare of the child will be a prime influence.
Thus, the Combined Uncompensated Taking and Market Ina-
lienability Without Refusal rule may be an efficient entitlement form
where the overriding societal concern is for the welfare of the object
of the entitlement and where that welfare is presumably maximized
by allocating in-kind use to the in-kind holder but where a back-up
mechanism is necessary for cases in which that presumption proves
false. Of course, for the Combined rule actually to maximize the
welfare of the object of the entitlement in cases where the presump-
tion for PartyA fails, Party B, who will then receive in-kind use, must
be the next best in-kind holder. In sum, the Combined Uncompen-
890 [Vol. 78:822
STRUCTURE OF ENTITLEMENTS
sated Taking and Market Inalienability Without Refusal rule, by ex-
tinguishing both the monetary compensation and the veto power
components, serves in some contexts to maximize the welfare of the
object of the entitlement (a child, for example) by allowing either
party to force a transfer, while eliminating monetary compensation
as an influence on the transfer decision.
The distributive implications of the Combined Uncompensated
Taking and Market Inalienability Without Refusal rule are not very
favorable to the in-kind holder. As under the Uncompensated Tak-
ing rule, the in-kind holder is not assured of in-kind enjoyment and
is not entitled to monetary compensation for relinquishing in-kind
enjoyment. The Combined rule is, however, more favorable to the
in-kind holder than the Uncompensated Taking rule insofar as the
in-kind holder can, under the Combined rule, force a transfer of the
in-kind component to Party B. The in-kind holder may value that
option, particularly if holding the in-kind use component turns out
to entail more costs than benefits.
Once again, then, a particular entitlement form, that is, a partic-
ular configuration of the four entitlement components, fosters effi-
ciency and distributive goals when utilized in appropriate contexts.
Familiarity with the distinct efficiency and distributive characteristics
of each of the fourteen entitlement forms will enable courts, legisla-
tures, and private legal decisionmakers to utilize the entitlement
forms that structure legal relations in the ways best suited to accom-
plish their goals. A clear and complete understanding of the forms
of entitlement will enhance the abilities of legal systems to foster the
goals of efficiency and of distributive justice to which we aspire.
D. A Final Observation
One additional observation about entitlements and their com-
ponents is worth noting: The veto power component or the mone-
tary compensation component of one entitlement can be treated as
the in-kind component of a distinct entitlement. Consider stock op-
tions, for instance. As was observed earlier,153 what is purchased
when one buys a call is the veto power component of the other
party's entitlement to the underlying stock. In the context of the
purchase of that veto power component, the veto power component
is the thing transferred and is treated as the in-kind component of a
distinct entitlement. To illustrate, let us say that you hold the veto
power component of your entitlement to your stock and that I want
to buy that veto power component. Can you require payment in
return for relinquishing to me the veto power over the stock? Yes,
153 See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
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assuming that you hold the monetary compensation component of
an entitlement the in-kind component of which is your veto power.
In the context of my purchasing your veto power from you, the veto
power component of the entitlement to the stock is now called a
"stock option" and is, as such, now treated as the in-kind component
of a distinct entitlement to a stock option. Do you have to sell the
stock option to me? That depends on whether you hold a veto
power component of the entitlement to the stock option. If the
stock-option entitlement is constructed as a Property rule, then I
will buy the stock option and you will sell it only if we both agree. If,
alternatively, your entitlement to that stock option is constructed as
a Liability rule (perhaps my employment contract with you entitles
me to purchase stock options from you, my employer), then I may
force a compensated transfer of the stock option. Thus, the veto
power component of one entitlement may be treated as the in-kind
component of a distinct entitlement which may, in turn, be con-
structed as any entitlement form.
A monetary compensation component too can be treated as the
in-kind component of a distinct entitlement. To create a Trans-
ferred Claim rule, for instance, Party A would sell the monetary
compensation component of her entitlement to freedom from tor-
tious injury to Party B. Party B would purchase Party A's "claim."
Does Party A have to sell? May she demand monetary compensa-
tion? That depends upon who holds the veto power and monetary
compensation components of the entitlement the in-kind compo-
nent of which is Party A's "claim." The monetary compensation
component of Party A's entitlement to freedom from tortious injury
is now called a "claim" and is now treated as the in-kind component
of a distinct entitlement to the claim.
Thus, a wide range of things including claims (monetary com-
pensation components) and options (veto power components) can
constitute the in-kind components of entitlements. Whatever the
content of that in-kind component, the posture of the other three
components (initiation choice, veto power, and monetary compen-
sation) defines the form of the entitlement constructed.
Efficiency and distributive consequences flow from both the ini-
tial allocation of the in-kind component and the form of entitlement
constructed-that is, the allocation of the other three entitlement
components. As has been discussed, different combinations of the
four entitlement components have different efficiency and distribu-
tive characteristics. Understanding the available forms of entitle-
ment, and the characteristics of each, will contribute to effective
legal design and legal decisionmaking. Courts, legislatures, and
other legal decisionmakers, equipped with a comprehensive view of
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the possible entitlement forms and their implications, would be ena-
bled to reason more precisely and to act more efficaciously in the
pursuit of the goals of efficiency and of justice.
CONCLUSION
The ambition of this Article has been to contribute to an under-
standing of the structure and substance of legal entitlements. To
that end, this Article has identified four components from which en-
titlements are constructed. This four-component model is not the
only valid approach to analyzing entitlements. Rather, it is one per-
spective-and, it is hoped, a useful one-on the subject.
W.N. Hohfeld, working early in this century, also developed
what may be characterized as a component-based approach to ana-
lyzing the structure of entitlements. I have argued that the
Hohfeldian framework is less useful in certain ways than it might
have been and that the four-component framework offered in the
present Article represents a preferable component-based
framework.
While Hohfeld attempted to identify the fundamental compo-
nents of legal entitlements, he did not undertake to identify the enti-
tlement forms that could be constructed from those components.
Calabresi and Melamed, by contrast, identified three entitlement
forms and presented a cogent analysis of the efficiency and distribu-
tive implications of each. Calabresi and Melamed did not, however,
undertake to analyze the substance and structure-the compo-
nents-of entitlement forms. The present Article has argued that,
when the four components of entitlements are identified and the
possible component combinations considered, not three but four-
teen coherent forms of entitlement emerge.
Because each of the fourteen entitlement forms has distinct effi-
ciency and distributive characteristics, each will be a more desirable
or less desirable form for any given context. Recognizing the avail-
able array of entitlement forms is crucial if legal decisionmakers are
to have access to the full range of tools available for achieving our
efficiency and distributive goals-including our goals of social jus-
tice. 154 Understanding the range of entitlement forms, its underly-
ing structure, and the characteristics and implications of each form
will permit the greatest possible flexibility and precision in the anal-
ysis, specification, and construction of legal entitlements.
This Article's four-component model and its analysis of the effi-
ciency and distributive characteristics of the fourteen basic entitle-
154 See supra note 61 (defining efficiency and distributive considerations to include
considerations of justice).
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ment forms will be valuable for legal analyses not only in areas, such
as property, that have traditionally been conceptualized in terms of
"bundles of rights," but also in areas that have not customarily been
conceptualized in that way. For example, as was discussed above,
new and potentially beneficial options for structuring child custody
law arise when the Combined Uncompensated Transfer and Market
Inalienability Without Refusal entitlement form is considered. 155
Moreover, the applicability of the ideas here presented is not
limited to the realm of private law.' 56 Employment discrimination
law, for instance, may benefit from a consideration of the full range
of entitlement forms. Entitlements against employment discrimina-
tion have traditionally been viewed exclusively as fully inalienable.
One may not sell nor give away one's equal employment entitle-
ments. That sole focus on full inalienability in equal employment
law is most appropriate where the discriminatory acts in question
are motivated by stereotyping or animus. But what of "rational dis-
crimination"-differential treatment motivated not, directly or indi-
rectly, by animus, but instead by, say, a profit motive? In such
circumstances, where equal employment goals conflict with other le-
gitimate goals, consideration of entitlement forms other than full ina-
lienability may prove most valuable.
Consideration of entitlement forms other than full inalienability
raises new options for handling complex employment discrimina-
tion issues such as fetal protection. Fetal protection recently arose
as an equal employment issue when some employers sought to ex-
clude all fertile women from jobs involving exposure to substances
harmful to fetuses. Such occupational exposure, the employers con-
tended, is unavoidable given currently available technology.' 5 7
In International Union, UA W v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,158 the
Supreme Court held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
prohibits female-exclusionary fetal protection policies.' 59 But, as
mentioned earlier,' 60 the Johnson Controls decision has not fully satis-
fied any camp.' 61 Many feminists have criticized the decision, ob-
155 See supra note 125, at 467-469 (discussing transfers of child custody between cus-
todians and government).
156 See supra note 64 and accompanying text (noting the applicability of the frame-
work here presented to both private and public law contexts).
157 Because fetal harm could result from substance exposures occurring before a
woman knows she is pregnant, excluding only pregnant workers from the jobs at issue
would not provide adequate fetal protection, the employers have argued. Hence, the
employers have instituted policies excluding all fertile women.
158 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
159 Id. at 1209-10.
160 See supra text accompanying note 16.
161 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. The "losers" (the defendants and
other employers with female-exclusionary fetal protection policies) may actually be the
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jecting that, while the decision is more favorable to women than a
holding for the defendants would have been, Johnson Controls still
leaves women with the burden of fetal protection; it is still women
who must either self-exclude from fetal-hazardous jobs, or constrain
their reproductive lives in accordance with job conditions, or else
risk fetal harm and resulting congenital disabilities in their
children.1 62
The fetal protection debate has consisted, essentially, of two
polar positions: first, that female-exclusionary fetal protection poli-
ies violate women's equal employment entitlements and therefore
must be enjoined, and second, that such policies do not violate wo-
men's equal employment entitlements and so must be permitted.
The bipolar nature of the debate has reflected an underlying as-
sumption that equal employment entitlements must necessarily be
constructed as fully inalienable, that is, that women may not transfer
their equal employment entitlements.
But a consideration of the available entitlement forms yields al-
ternative approaches to the fetal protection problem. The possibil-
ity of constructing women's equal employment entitlements in the
fetal protection context as entitlement forms other than full inaliena-
bility offers potential efficiency and distributive benefits. 6 3 For ex-
ample, if women's equal employment entitlements in the fetal
protection context were constructed as Property-rule entitlements,
then employers might purchase agreements from female employees
to forbear from reproduction during a designated period. Such
purchases would be voluntary transactions at negotiated prices.
Under such an arrangement, female workers could agree-in ex-
change for compensation-not to give birth during some specified
period. 64 This sort of a scheme would address the problems of fe-
tal risk165 without leaving the full burden of fetal protection on wo-
parties best served by the decision since the majority opinion broadly hints that the
Johnson Controls decision itself may insulate employers from future tort liability for fetal
injuries resulting from substance exposure. The opinion states: "If, under general tort
principles, Tide VII bans sex-specific fetal-protection policies, the employer fully in-
forms the woman of the risk, and the employer has not acted negligently, the basis for
holding an employer liable seems remote at best." 111 S. Ct. at 1208.
162 See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 16.
163 Again, efficiency and distributive considerations are defined broadly in this Arti-
cle to include justice considerations. See supra note 61.
164 The specified period could be, perhaps, the duration of employment or could,
alternatively, be limited to times in which high levels of the offending substance had
been detected in the woman's blood stream.
165 An employer presumably would institute a compensated-transfer fetal protection
program if the fetal risk level in the workplace were sufficient to warrant the cost of
compensation to female employees. A compensated-transfer program would not be in-
stituted, presumably, if the fetal risk level-as measured by the employer, in moral
and/or tort liability terms--did not warrant the purchase price for protection.
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men. At the same time, requiring employers to bear the costs of
workplace fetal protection would provide incentives for technologi-
cal and other development to provide for future workplaces free
from fetal hazards.
Of course, using a Property rule in this context might give rise
to transaction-cost problems. If employers were permitted to em-
ploy only women who charged attractive prices for the in-kind com-
ponents of their equal employment entitlements (i.e., their
entitlements to submit to no greater reproductive limitations than
male employees), then competition for employment might drive
down the price of women's in-kind components to zero (an outcome
that some would favor as efficient and others would object to on
efficiency and/or distributive grounds). If, on the other hand, em-
ployers were prohibited from firing (or not hiring) women who
"charge too much" for the in-kind components of their equal em-
ployment entitlements, then women could "hold up" employers for
sums exceeding the actual value to the women of their in-kind
components.
If such transaction-cost problems rendered use of Property
rules undesirable in the fetal protection context, then Liability, Re-
verse Liability, and Combined Liability and Reverse Liability rules
could be considered. Such rules would allow employers (under a
Liability rule) or women (under a Reverse Liability rule) or both
(under a Combined rule) to force transfer of the in-kind component
at a collectively set price. Under a Liability rule, female workers
would be required to transfer the in-kind components of their
equal-reproductive-freedom-in-employment entitlements to em-
ployers as a condition of employment. Such use of a Liability rule
would preclude "hold ups" of the employer by pre-determining the
sale price (but would also, of course, reduce women workers' auton-
omy, since effectuating a compensated transfer of equal reproduc-
tive freedom would be a condition of employment). Under a
Reverse Liability rule, employers would be required to purchase in-
kind entitlements to equal reproductive freedom in employment at
the pre-set price from women electing to force a transfer. Use of a
Reverse Liability rule would help to avoid a bidding down of the
price of the in-kind components. A Combined Liability and Reverse
Liability rule would render the benefits afforded by both the Liabil-
ity and the Reverse Liability rules (but would, like the Liability rule,
also limit women's autonomy).
If even rare breaches of duties of fetal protection were consid-
ered unacceptable, or if such breaches were difficult to detect or to
prove, then a Mandatory Transfer rule might be considered. Under
the Mandatory Transfer rule, employers would be required to buy,
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and women workers required to sell, the in-kind component of the
women's entitlement to equal reproductive freedom in employment.
The amount of compensation for the transfer would be pre-set.
This approach, while providing the greatest guarantee of fetal pro-
tection, would do so at the price of limiting women's and employers'
flexibility and autonomy.
Any of the entitlement forms here considered could be modi-
fied by a no-gift/minimum-price constraint 166 if it were feared that
underpricing of the in-kind component might result from allowing
price negotiations to occur in the shadow of the collectively-set
price. It should also be noted that successful use of any of the rules
here considered would require that employers be prohibited (in
practice as well as in theory) from refusing to employ women be-
cause of fetal protection costs.
Use of a Property, Liability, Reverse Liability, Combined Liabil..
ity and Reverse Liability, or Mandatory Transfer rule in the fetal
protection context would allow for compensated transfers of the in-
kind components of women's entitlements to equal reproductive
freedom in employment. Permitting such compensated transfers
would enable us to reduce fetal harm without placing the costs of
doing so on women. Moreover, compensated transfer arrange-
ments would create desirable incentives for employers to develop
fetal-safe workplaces.
Thus, efficiency and distributive goals might be better achieved
in the fetal protection context by considering a range of possible
entitlement forms rather than limiting our thinking to allow only for
Full Inalienability rules in equal employment law. This is not to say
that these alternative entitlement forms offer a fetal-protection pan-
acea. Indeed, application of any of the rules here considered would
give rise to a panoply of practical and theoretical complexities (to be
more fully explored in a forthcoming Article).167 What the consid-
eration of a range of entitlement forms does offer in the fetal protec-
tion context is options: previously unseen and unconsidered
approaches to the problem of fetal protection are revealed once a
range of entitlement forms is considered.
Broader ranges of options are also revealed in the affirmative
action context when possible entitlement forms beyond full inalien-
ability are explored. Some courts have applied Liability rules to
provide compensation to individuals "dispreferred" on the basis of
166 See supra note 108 (stating that no-gift/minimum-price constraints prohibit the
gift of the in-kind component or its sale at any price lower than the collectively-set mini-
mum price).
167 The complexities involved would, of course, include the moral and political is-
sues fundamental to questions of reproductive control.
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race under employers' remedial affirmative action policies. 168 Con-
sideration of additional entitlement forms would offer even further
options in that context.
In these equal employment areas, considering a broad range of
entitlement forms, rather than being limited to the traditional con-
ception of equal employment entitlements as exclusively fully ina-
lienable, holds the promise of leading to more desirable and more
just results. Such a broadened exploration offers potential benefits
in areas in which innovative ideas are very much needed.
Not only equal employment law, but many areas of law not tra-
ditionally conceptualized in "entitlement" terms may benefit from
the approach presented in the present Article. The four-component
model with its fourteen entitlement forms may offer opportunities
for new conceptualizations and approaches to legal problems in di-
verse areas of the law. It is hoped that the present Article may make
some contribution to the breadth of options for analyzing and for
resolving a full spectrum of legal problems.
168 See, e.g., McAleer v. AT&T, 416 F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1976) (ordering compensa-
tion to a dispreferred); Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Gas.
(BNA) 778 (E.D. Va. 1974) (requiring wage protection for dispreferreds), rev'd on other
grounds, 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976). Such use of Liability
rules is singularly appropriate in cases where affirmative action plans are used to remedy
the employer's past intentional discrimination. In such cases, the value and justice of
having the at-fault employer bear the costs of the remedy rather than being permitted
simply to pass those costs on to dispreferred employees is most clear.
Regarding the potential benefits of using Liability rules in the affirmative action
context, see J. Hoult Verkerke, Note, Compensating Victims of Preferential Employment Dis-
crimination Remedies, 98 YALE L.J. 1479, 1498-99 (1989) ("It would be difficult to frame an
argument for the proposition that incumbent employees should bear remedial costs
rather than customers, shareholders, or managers.").
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